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Chapter 1: Introduction: Wilderness Against Recreation
California's Sierra Nevada, circa 2000: Families and groups of avid 
downhill skiers alike travel twenty-five winding miles by road from the town  of 
Three Rivers to a parking garage, to then be transported to the high alpine valley 
of Mineral King in Tulare County–said to be one of the finest skiing locations in 
the world. With numerous developed bowls, ridgetop restaurants and shopping, 
dining, and lodging on the valley floor, the area attracts over 2 million visitors a 
year, in winter and summer both. The high speed, all-year access road, improved 
especially for the private Disney development on national forest land, cuts 
through part of Sequoia National Park, harming several giant sequoias as its 
automobile traffic pollutes the air of the southern Sierra Nevada and San Joaquin 
Valley. The U.S. Forest Service and Walt Disney Productions make a healthy 
profit off the ski resort.
Further north, 3,000 cars a day pass over the Minaret Summit Highway, 
the only trans-Sierra road in the 270 miles between Tioga Pass on the north and 
Walker Pass to the south. Coursing narrowly along an avenue purposefully left 
open in the 1930s between the legislated Minarets and John Muir Wildernesses, 
the road connects Madera County foothill communities with Mammoth Lakes 
(and its ski resort) and points east. Long a dream of Central Valley businessmen, 
the road was finally constructed in the 1970s as an all-year highway, despite 
crossing the mountains at an altitude above 9,000 feet. In severing the longest 
roadless wilderness in the United States, the highway also cut through the John 
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Muir Trail, a 211-mile-long hiking trail connecting Mount Whitney and Yosemite 
National Park. After years of discussion, backers justified the narrow, two-lane 
mountain road as a defense highway and to allow agricultural goods produced in 
the valley to more easily compete on price in eastern markets.
These projects were never realized, but the efforts to construct them 
spanned decades. The Mineral King ski resort (including its access road, 
improvement of which was essential to the development) and the Minaret 
Summit Highway were halted through efforts led by the Sierra Club, an early 
conservation club that became increasingly active and combative in natural 
resource fights following World War II. Significantly, the Sierra Club had earlier 
officially endorsed both a trans-Sierra highway over Mammoth Pass (very near to 
Minaret Summit) and ski development at Mineral King. From its founding in 
1892, the Club had as its purpose to “explore, enjoy, and render accessible” the 
mountains of the Pacific Coast. In the conservation debate of the early twentieth 
century, led by Club founder and environmental philosopher John Muir, the Club 
advocated preservation for recreation over use of natural resources. The 
preservation advocated by the Club in Yosemite National Park, for instance, 
disallowed a dam in the Hetch Hetchy Valley, but encouraged development for 
people, including constructing roads for access.1 The Club's focus on access, 
reflected in part through boosting certain recreational roads, changed mid-
1 Robert W. Righter, The Battle Over Hetch Hetchy: America's Most Controversial Dam and the 
Birth of Modern Environmentalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 6, 107. In 
attempting to keep San Francisco from damming Hetch Hetchy for a municipal reservoir, the 
Sierra Club sought infrastructure in the valley to support visitors, including a road into Hetch 
Hetchy, as well as up the still-wild Tuolumne Canyon to Tuolumne Meadows.
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century as visitation to the Sierra Nevada mushroomed as a result of an 
expanding California population, an increased affinity for outdoor recreation, and 
a network of paved roads in national parks and forests.2 In 1951, the Club's 
mission became “to explore, enjoy, and preserve the Sierra Nevada and other 
scenic resources in the United States,” evidence of a shift in the values of Club 
leaders that is indicative of how the Club became increasingly wary of 
recreational developments. 
The Sierra Club played a part in this expanded access through its relations 
to the majority federal land managers in the range, the United States Forest 
Service and the National Park Service. The Sierra Nevada saw its first national 
parks in 1890, its first national forests in 1891, and the Sierra Club's founding in 
1892.3 The Sierra Club advocated formally protecting much of the Sierra Nevada 
from resource development, and the Club worked closely with the Forest Service 
and Park Service to expand the acreage under such protection. The Club's 
mission particularly aligned with the preservationist impulse of the National Park 
Service (established in 1916), and key early leaders of the Park Service were also 
Sierra Club members. But this cooperation between the Club and federal land 
managers, tenuously balanced on the pillars of tourism promotion and land 
2 The population numbers are particularly staggering. California went from 1.5 million residents 
in 1900, to 5.7 million in 1930 and 15.7 million in 1960. (James D. Hart, A Companion to 
California (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 501-503. California social critic Carey 
McWilliams saw the State's growth as a defining characteristic of its history, commenting that 
California differed from other states in that it “has not grown or evolved so much as it has been 
hurtled forward, rocket-fashion, by a series of chain-reaction explosions.” (Carey McWilliams, 
California: The Great Exception, 1949 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 
1998), 25.
3 Although Yosemite had been granted protection in 1864, it did not receive national park status 
until 1890.
3
protection, broke down in the 1950s as the land managers promoted increased 
development of Sierran lands (both in natural resource use, such as logging, and 
recreational development, including roads) and the Club eschewed development 
in favor of increased preservation. The Club's changing position dovetailed with 
other events helping to form the modern environmental movement, including the 
struggle to define and defend wilderness, and the emergence of a younger 
generation of environmental leaders. 
Just as people construct roads, they can also construct the concept of 
wilderness. Americans have continued to redefine wilderness in response to their 
historical circumstances. Roderick Frazier Nash, in his classic Wilderness and 
the American Mind, traces the history of the idea from settlers fearful of the 
wilderness areas “alien to man,” through the nineteenth century romantic 
appreciation of wilderness, to a more modern idea of wilderness defined against 
natural resource use, as happened at Hetch Hetchy.4 Nash continues this 
wilderness/use dichotomy through the 1950s, emphasizing the battle waged by 
the Sierra Club and The Wilderness Society to keep the proposed Echo Park Dam 
out of Dinosaur National Monument as a necessary prelude to securing passage 
of the Wilderness Act of 1964.
Environmental historian William Cronon touched off a firestorm of debate 
in the 1990s when he questioned the usefulness of the concept of wilderness.5 He 
4 Roderick Frazier Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind, 4th ed., rev. and updated (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2001).
5 William Cronon, “The Trouble with Wilderness; or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature,” in 
Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human Place in Nature, ed. William Cronon (New York and 
London: Norton), 1995, pp. 69-90.
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acutely points out that wilderness exists as “the creation of very particular human 
cultures at very particular moments in human history....it is a product of that 
civilization.”6 Inasmuch as culture creates wilderness areas, Cronon argues, they 
cannot help but to reproduce the values of the society trying to reject it, even if 
wilderness advocates seek to reject such values. Each wilderness does have a 
history, and this history in turn shapes how people think about and value the 
wilderness. The Minaret Summit battle, in which the Sierra Club sought to close a 
non-wilderness corridor left open between two other wilderness areas, 
demonstrates that wilderness is not just about what a natural area contains, but 
also more generally about the proper relationship between humans and nature.
In Driven Wild, Paul Sutter challenges the stasis of Nash's wilderness/use 
dichotomy through the first half of the twentieth century. In examining the 
founders and formation of The Wilderness Society, Sutter shows how the modern 
idea of wilderness (as embodied in the Wilderness Act's definition of the term) 
came out of the interwar years. The idea that wilderness equated to roadless 
areas, Sutter argues, “was a product of battles between preservation and 
recreational development, not preservation and resource use.”7 Sutter shows how 
the Society's founders grew concerned over the effects of mass recreation on wild 
lands. Although the Wilderness Act so very clearly embraces this interwar 
definition, for Sutter the roadless thrust diminished in the postwar period, as 
6 Ibid., 69.
7 Paul Sutter, Driven Wild: How the Fight Against Automobiles Launched the Modern 
Wilderness Movement (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2002), 242.
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increased timber cutting and water development threatened federally managed 
lands.8 While detailing the great postwar recreation boom, born of cheap 
gasoline, rising prosperity, and greater leisure time, Mark Harvey also argues for 
the significance increased natural resource use, and specifically water 
development, as “threats to the wilderness” following World War II.9
The Sierra Club and The Wilderness Society worked as partners in 
opposing the Echo Park Dam, each led by  younger leaders who were part of a 
new generation of environmentalists. David Brower, the militant Sierra Club 
President whose take-no-prisoners environmental attitude twice caused him to 
found new environmental organizations, defined the new, uncompromising 
environmental philosophy. Robert Gottlieb writes that the Glen Canyon 
compromise “forced the group to further reconsider its approach concerning 
wilderness.”10 And yet the postwar activities of the Sierra Club had just as much 
to do with the reaction to increased recreation as they do with natural resource 
use—perhaps more so. The Club only belatedly adopted the Society's ideas. As 
late as 1937 the Club agreed to a new road crossing the Sierra Nevada, and as late 
as 1947 supported the widening of the Tioga Road through Yosemite National 
Park and development of skiing facilities at Mineral King.
8 Ibid., 259.
9 Mark Harvey, “Loving the Wild in Postwar America,” in American Wilderness: A New History,  
ed. Michael Lewis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 193.
10 Robert Gottlieb, Forcing the Spring: The Transformation of the American Environmental 
Movement, rev. and updated (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 2005), 78.
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The specific event that caused the Sierra Club to reevaluate its promotion 
of access to mountains of the Pacific Coast was a late 1940s proposal for a ski 
resort atop the Mount San Gorgonio, the highest mountain in Southern 
California. But these other key events in the Sierra, revolving around roads and 
recreation, decisively shaped the Sierra Club's wilderness thinking. From heavily 
involved in the promotion of Sierran national parks and their attendant roads 
from the 1890s onward, the Club only gradually came to question the federal land 
managers and the consequences of increased automobile-oriented recreation to 
natural areas generally and to national parks specifically.
David Louter has examined the trilateral relations of roads, parks, and 
wilderness through Washington's national parks.11 Because Mount Rainier, 
Olympic, and North Cascades were “developed” by the Park Service over many 
decades, the parks offer a particularly good backdrop for the changing 
conceptions of park roads. Louter finds that, while the Park Service downplayed 
the importance of roads visiting the chief scenic attractions of the parks, 
automobiles still had a role to play in mediating the natural experience. He 
argues that “Americans do not have a strict definition of wilderness,” leading to a 
bifurcated definition of national parks: “one branch for roadless advocates, the 
other for mass culture.”12 That is, for people sympathetic to the goals of The 
Wilderness Society, national parks could be seen as threats to wilderness, but for 
11 David Louter, Windshield Wilderness: Cars, Roads, and Nature in Washington's National 
Parks (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2006).
12 Ibid., 8.
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many others the national parks (roads and all) are the definition of wilderness. 
While my study looks at projects in both national parks and national forests, this 
bifurcation of thoughts on roads and wilderness is readily apparent, for both the 
road proponents and the Sierra Club opposition claimed to be advocates for 
wilderness. Did allowing for recreational use threaten wilderness, or enhance it? 
The road proponents, such as Congressman B. F. Sisk who championed the 
Minaret Summit road, believed that the Sierra could yet support more roads; the 
Club felt the balance had already tipped too far in favor of protection.
Automobile-oriented consumer recreation had been the foundation for the 
national park system, as developed by the Park Service's Stephen Mather and his 
staff of landscape architects. Anne Mitchell Whisnant has shown the regional 
effect of such development in her study of the Blue Ridge Parkway in Virginia and 
North Carolina.13 Far from a road that lay lightly on the land (as parkways were 
said to do), creation of the Blue Ridge Parkway “required the arbitration of many 
significant disputes over substantial issues across boundaries of power.”14 The 
actors chronicled by Sutter reacted in part to this parkway, and the 
commercialism brought on by building such roads for tourism. 
My Sierran case studies add to this growing literature on park roads, 
recreation, tourism, and wilderness, then, by focusing on how a small regional 
organization intent on encouraging recreational use of the mountains, including 
13 Anne Mitchell Whisnant, Super-Scenic Motorway: A Blue Ridge Parkway History (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006) .
14 Ibid., 4. Timothy Davis provides an excellent overview of the parkway ideal in his “The Rise and 
Decline of the American Parkway,” in The World Beyond the Windshield: Roads and Landscapes 
in the United States and Europe, ed. Christof Mauch and Thomas Zeller (Athens: Ohio University 
Press, 2008), 35-58.
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through automobile access, became an outspoken advocate for roadless 
wilderness, questioning the value of mass tourism. Like Sutter and Louter, these 
stories show how wilderness in the southern Sierra Nevada emerged out of 
particular historical circumstances. The Sierra Club's battles against 
improvement to the Tioga Road, completion of the Minaret Summit highway 
across the mountains, and reconstruction of the road to Mineral King particularly 
mirror the interwar tenor of wilderness debate discussed by Sutter. Unlike Nash, 
Sutter, and Harvey, however, who maintain that the postwar wilderness debates 
were again about preservation versus use, I argue that conflicts over roads and 
recreation were just as instrumental in influencing that postwar wilderness 
debate. While the Sierra Club did participate in the charge against dams 
elsewhere in the West, its home base has always been the Sierra Nevada. The 
Club's preservation activities in the mountains following the war defined the Club 
against itself, as it no longer supported the tourism and recreation it once had. 
The Sierra Club and The Wilderness Society worked together for the Wilderness 
Act because they shared a common belief in the deleterious effect of roads in 
natural areas; the narrative below explains how the Sierra Club battled its past to 
arrive at this definition.
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Chapter 2: Sierran Geography and the Nineteenth Century
The place called California entered the European imagination as an island. 
Whether explorer Hernán Cortés applied the name because of any similarities he 
found between the land and the island described in Las Sergas de Esplandián (a 
1510 Spanish romance novel), the comparison is apt.15 Though California is 
landlocked (if not entirely static), the idea of California as an isolated entity has 
been borne out historically in its relationship with the United States. Until 
completion of the transcontinental railroad in 1869, California was easier 
accessible by boat than by land. The barrier of the Sierra Nevada has largely 
determined this isolation.16 Although the range is now crossed by nine roads 
(including one interstate highway) and several railroad lines in the north, the 
Sierra still serves as a formidable natural barrier to the movement of people and 
goods.
The Sierra Nevada consists of a single uplifted granite block, an impressive 
400-mile-long massif separating California from the East. The northern end of 
the range blends into Lassen Peak and the Cascade Range; in the south, the 
15 Erwin G. Gudde, California Place Names: The Origin and Etymology of Current Geographical  
Names, 4th ed., revised and enlarged by William Bright (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1998), pp. 59-61. While Spanish explorers did find male inhabitants of California (conflicting with 
the novel's claims of an all-female population), the abundance of gold discovered later did 
harmonize with the book's description.
16 The Sierran barrier sits along much of the state's eastern border. Other impediments to the east 
and south are the deserts: the Great Basin (including Death Valley), the Mojave, and the 
Colorado.
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Fig. 1. California Overview Map, 2008. Shown are principal interstate and U.S.  
Highway routes for the entire State, as well as the main roads in the Sierra 
Nevada. Produced by the author.
Sierra meets the Tehachapi Mountains at Tehachapi Pass. Due to the specific 
circumstances of orogeny, the Sierra's eastern escarpment is significantly steeper 
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than the western slope, with significant consequences for its transportation 
history. While the approach from the Central Valley evinces a remarkably steady, 
gradual rise from the valley floor, the eastern edge of the block—particularly in 
the south, in the area in which this study is concerned—drops dramatically. The 
Owens Valley, a 75-mile long graben alongside the eastern side of the Southern 
Sierra, lies at 4,000 feet elevation. Sierran peaks tower over this area to heights 
exceeding 14,000 feet. Mt. Whitney, at 14,505 feet, is the highest point in the 
contiguous United States.
Looking back to the Gold Rush and decades following (from 1848 to the 
early 1870s) is crucial to understanding California's history and particularly 
subsequent events in the Sierra Nevada. Hundreds of thousands of miners 
displaced the native populations in the Sierra, whose population may have 
numbered as high as 50,000.17 But those who came for gold did not distribute 
themselves evenly across the mountain range; rather, they concentrated 
themselves in the north, with the easily accessible mineral deposits on the 
American and Bear rivers. The High Sierra offered little of interest to the miners. 
Instead, they congregated in what came to be known as the Mother Lode area, a 
zone in the western foothills stretching 120 miles from Georgetown in the north 
to Mariposa in the south.18
17 Indians did not permanently inhabit the higher reaches Sierra Nevada, but did retreat to its 
cooler comforts during summer months. Sierran Indians lived in the foothills—precisely the area 
in which miners concentrated themselves. For this relationship and displacement, see David 
Beesley, Crow's Range: An Environmental History of the Sierra Nevada (Reno and Las Vegas: 
University of Nevada Press, 2004), 15-43.
18 Hart, 284.
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The work and settlement patterns of the Gold Rush are so important to 
today's Sierra Nevada because these patterns of human population and use are 
largely still intact. The roads that cross the northern Sierra, from Donner Pass to 
Sonora Pass, were either created or substantially improved because of mining 
activities and the associated immigration from the East (and many other 
countries, besides).19 Many towns in the Sierra foothills trace their origins to the 
middle of the nineteenth century and today use this history to garner their share 
of the tourist trade. But for the area south of what is now Yosemite National Park, 
without gold to attract 49ers, comparatively little settlement occurred. Mineral 
King experienced something of a mining boom in the 1870s, leading to 
construction of a small town on the valley floor, but the area's name belies 
promoters' hopes more than it does the wealth that was found in the mountains.
California, Here I Come: Gold, Trails, and Roads
Overland migration to California from the East did not begin with the Gold 
Rush. It is true that the pace of immigration changed qualitatively upon discovery 
of gold by James W. Marshall in 1848, but since the Bidwell-Bartleson Party of 
1841 settlers had headed west for opportunity. Due to distance and geography, 
the journey exposed travelers to severe hardships. Finding a path across the 
Sierra had earlier presented problems to fur trappers and explorers such as Kit 
19 Unlike in other areas of the country, the Sierra Nevada's roads were not originally Indian paths. 
Geographer Thomas Frederick Howard concludes that “...it does not appear from early travelers' 
accounts that Indians played an indispensable role in traverses of the Sierra” (Sierra Crossing:  
First Roads to California (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 54). The Indian known 
as Truckee did, however, point out what became the Truckee route, future path for the Donner 
Party, the transcontinental railroad, U.S. 40, and Interstate 80.
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Carson, Jedediah Smith, and John Charles Frémont. The enormous difficulties 
experienced by the Donner-Reed Party in trying to cross the Sierra in 1846, 
resulting in the deaths of half of the party, dramatically illustrate the geographic 
difficulties faced by the emigrants and for a time caused the Donner Pass (or 
Truckee) route to fall into disuse. Still, by the time settlers came to California for 
gold, the trails were well trod—if not nearly as convenient or reliable as the paved 
highways of the twentieth century.20
The Gold Rush defined California's early development as a state and its 
effects continue to influence land use in the Sierra Nevada. The specific 
distribution of gold and other minerals, coupled with possibilities offered by the 
terrain, influenced how mining activities played out. It was the single most 
important event in the area's American period and, germane to this investigation 
of Sierran roadbuilding, the distribution of population and travel networks of 
today can be traced back to that period. Improvement and development of wagon 
roads crossing the range continued for decades after, but the impact of mining on 
determining those networks cannot be overstated.
At the time of gold discovery in 1848, emigrants' options for entering 
California were limited, though settlers trusting to promoters of phantom routes 
could considerably expand their choices. The few routes available across the 
Sierra, as pointed out by geographer Thomas Frederick Howard, fulfilled the 
needs of parties traveling on a once-in-a-lifetime journey, but were ill-suited for 
20 Sierra Nevada historian Francis Farquhar notes that most of those who came overland in search 
of gold “followed the established Truckee route,” but others experimented and opened up new 
routes. (History of the Sierra Nevada (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965), 65.)
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repeated travel and certainly insufficient to really tie California to the East. 
Rather, the Gold Rush “worked a change in attitude regarding improved roads” 
as the dictates of commerce and homesickness made themselves known.21 The 
roads that resulted from these booster efforts, in the form of their paved and 
improved successors, are the roads that today cross the northern Sierra Nevada. 
Stewart Mitchell, a California Department of Transportation employee writing in 
a centennial commemoration of California roads, states that such routes “were 
particularly prominent during the period of settlement and early growth and are 
still a very vital factor in the economic and social life of the State.”22 By 1853, Gold 
Rush settlers had a choice of routes. Significantly, Mitchell notes that the relative 
popularity of the routes “increased or declined with the fortunes of the area it 
served.”23 The boosters and their roads were predicated on serving mining 
settlements.
State politics soon played a part in the wagon roads story, for California 
quickly transitioned to statehood in 1850. Mitchell calls the 1850s the “era of the 
trails,” for while there was no end to the proposals and interest in wagon road 
construction, no money was forthcoming until the end of the decade.24 In 1855 
the California Legislature passed the State Wagon Road Act, to provide for a 
single link on a transcontinental wagon road. Challenges to the act's 
21 Howard, 54.





constitutionality and regional infighting among communities possibly to be 
served, however, hampered its possible effect. Indeed, Sierran roadbuilding 
reached its zenith in 1865, at which time the coming of the transcontinental 
railroad promised to overturn the traditional order of Sierran roads.
Wagon roads enabled the first settlers and miners to reach the interior of 
California, but did not offer a permanent solution to the transportation problem. 
The seminal event in tying California to the rest of the nation came with 
completion of the transcontinental railroad in 1869. The California-to-Utah 
portion, known as the Central Pacific Railroad, succeeded in crossing the 
formidable Sierran barrier that twenty years before had presented such problems 
to wagon trains. The railroad made possible more regular transit across the 
mountains, something impossible with wagons and Sierran weather. In 
presenting a more reliable alternative for trans-Sierran traffic, the railroad's 
opening contributed to the decline of these wagon roads, which thereafter served 
only local traffic—that is, until three more decades had passed and the 
automobile again focused public interest on these crossings.25 The wagon roads, 
in the first place, were seen as temporary, their discussions underlain by the 
prospect of a transcontinental railroad. Additionally, the idea of such a train 
linking the coasts appeared before wagons had ever crossed the Sierra Nevada.26
As could be expected from the challenging topography of the Sierra 




challenging.27 Most of the work was done by Chinese workers, who had to 
contend with the worst of the Sierran weather. Heavy rains in the lower 
elevations and heavy snows higher up limited the work that could be done. 
Despite the Central Pacific employing over ten thousand men working on the 
railroad, progress came slowly in the mountains—particularly as the Chinese 
blasted through the Sierran granite to complete the Summit Tunnel through the 
Sierran crest.28 The railroad conquered the mountain, but only with supreme 
effort and at great cost.29 The railroad's backers were assured of profit from 
government awards, but later Sierran roads had no such economic incentives.
Upon the railroad's completion, Howard writes that the once-significant 
wagon roads “sank into decrepitude at varying rates, depending on how closely 
the railroad paralleled and outperformed them.”30 The Truckee Route, once a 
main thoroughfare, then neglected, then revived with the coming of the railroad, 
once again fell into disuse. Proximity to the railroad meant that it offered no 
geographic advantages, nor did it offer faster or better service. The Lake Tahoe 
Wagon Road continued as a toll road for another seventeen years, before 
27 Due to the low friction of the railroad and the length of trains, specifications for railroad track 
were much more demanding than those for modern automobile roads.
28 Stephen E. Ambrose, Nothing Like It in the World: The Men Who Built the Transcontinental  
Railroad, 1863-1869 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), 230-248.
29 Mother Nature could reclaim the mountains at will, however, as seen when the diesel passenger 
train “City of San Francisco” and its 226 passengers were stranded for a week in 1952 near 
Donner Pass because of deep snow. For an account of this dramatic event, see Howard W. Bull, 
“The Case of the Stranded Streamliner: The Rescue of SP's Snowbound 'City of San Francisco' at 
Yuba Pass, January 13-19, 1952.” Trains  & Travel 13, no. 3 (1953), available online at the Central 




purchase as a public (toll free) highway by El Dorado County in 1886 and much 
later improvement as U.S. 50.31 The twentieth century shifted the transportation 
focus to automobile roads, with these roads shaped by forces absent in the 
preceding decades. Notably, new road construction occurred in the context of 
national parks, national forests, and the environmental movement. New Sierran 
automobile roads did not serve mining interests, but served a nature recreation-
oriented constituency.
31 Ibid., 175.  Although there is little secondary research on the conversion of wagon roads to 
automobile roads, some information can be found in Howard, 174-179, and Mitchell, 66-68. 
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Chapter 3: The Sierra Nevada in Federal Hands, 1890s to 
1950s
From the 1890s to the 1950s, the Sierra became intensively managed by 
the federal government and heavily visited by recreational tourists in 
automobiles. The creation of new federal management forms, national parks and 
national forests, combined with the Sierra Club's founding and the growth of 
automobile touring to form the basis for today's Sierra Nevada. Although it 
contained no wilderness areas, the southern Sierra of 1890 was wild: in broad 
terms, it was almost entirely unpopulated, had few large-scale extractive uses, 
and, important for this study, few developed roads and no trans-Sierra routes. As 
the Forest and Park Services took control and made provisions for use, roads 
were improved or built anew. The Sierra Club joined in promoting access by 
proposing or endorsing roads throughout the southern Sierra. Interagency rivalry 
and Club calls for protection of natural areas counterbalanced this quest for 
access, however, and wilderness protection came to the Sierra as early as the 
1920s.
The Sierra Club's founding in 1892 closely followed both establishment of 
California's first national parks (1890) and the forest reserve system (1891). 
Composed mainly of residents of the San Francisco Bay Area, the Club organized 
itself around appreciation and outings in the Sierra Nevada. The club, then, both 
advocated for protection of parks and forests (such as with Yosemite) and 
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organized trips into the Sierra, naming and exploring remote parts of the range.32 
And because the date of its founding and its area of interest so closely 
corresponds with establishment of Sierran national parks and forests, both the 
Club and these federal areas have practically grown up together. While the Sierra 
Club was far from the only party interested in Sierran issues, it has proved an 
influential voice in the ongoing conversation.
The Sierra Club enjoyed fraternal relations with both the Park and Forest 
Services because of mutual interest in protecting lands and providing for use, and 
this relationship constitutes important background with which to contrast later 
clashes. In the 1940s and 1950s, the Club came to disagree with the agencies on a 
number of issues related to access. Elsewhere in the West, the Sierra Club 
confronted the Park Service over conservation issues, particularly dams. In the 
Sierra Nevada, the issue of access drove a wedge between the organizations. 
Federal land managers, within both the Park Service and the Forest Service, 
recognized the increasing visitation following World War II and planned 
accordingly. A new generation of leaders within the Sierra Club emerged during 
this time that disagreed with the earlier philosophy of promoting access through 
development.
32 Michael McCloskey, Sierra Club Executive Director: The Evolving Club and the 
Environmental Movement, 1961-1981, an oral history conducted in 1981 by Susan R. Schrepfer, 
Sierra Club History Series, Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of 
California, Berkeley, 1983, 174.
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Federal Management of the Sierra Nevada: Increased Protection through 
Interagency Politics
If the Sierra landscape has been shaped significantly by actions of 
individuals (such as gold miners) and small organizations (like the road-building 
enterprises of gold rush days), it has since been most impacted by actions of the 
federal government—the majority landowner in the range. This reflects the 
pervasiveness of the federal government throughout the twentieth-century West, 
both in resource administration and transportation.33 But the federal 
government, of course, has not acted monolithically in controlling these lands. 
Rather, the prime influence on Sierran lands has been administration through 
the Park Service (formed 1916) and the Forest Service (formed 1905). Situated in 
two different departments (the Department of the Interior and the Department of 
Agriculture, respectively), each agency possesses its own goals, priorities, and 
management strategies that sometimes conflict—even though their lands 
frequently neighbor one another.34 Influenced by California citizens, 
33 Gerald D. Nash, The Federal Landscape: An Economic History of the Twentieth-Century West 
(Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1999), x.
34 This back-and-forth between the agencies is well-covered in both general works on federal land 
management and agency history, such as in Richard West Sellars, Preserving Nature in the 
National Parks: A History (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1997 ) or Harold K. 
Steen, The U.S. Forest Service: A History, Centennial ed. (Durham, NC: Forest History Society in 
association with University of Washington Press, 2004); in regional histories like Anthony 
Godfrey, The Ever-Changing View: A History of the National Forests in California (Pacific 
Southwest Region: USDA Forest Service, 2005) and Beesley; and investigations of administrative 
units, like Lary M. Dilsaver and William C. Tweed, Challenge of the Big Trees: A Resource  
History of Sequoia and Kings Canyon National Parks (Three Rivers, Calif.: Sequoia Natural 
History Association, Inc., 1990). A summary can also be found in Hal K. Rothman, “'A Regular 
Ding-Dong Fight': Agency Culture and Evolution in the NPS-USFS Dispute, 1916-1937,” The 
Western Historical Quarterly 20 (1989): 141-161.
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organizations, and businesses, as well as national interests, the agencies have 
tried to balance demands from these various interests in land use. At the same 
time, they have competed with one another politically to maintain and enlarge 
their geographic domains. This back-and-forth significantly impacted Sierran 
lands, contributing to the creation of wilderness areas on national forests and 
influencing legislation expanding Sequoia National Park and creating Kings 
Canyon.
Congress first authorized the President to create national forests—to be 
managed as “forest reserves” by the Division of Forestry within the Department 
of the Interior—in 1891.35 The Division of Forestry became the Bureau of Forestry 
in 1901. In 1905, through the efforts of Gifford Pinchot, a trained forester and 
progressive, management of the forest reserves transferred to the Bureau of 
Forestry in the Department of Agriculture, which was then renamed the U.S. 
Forest Service.36 The reserves shared with national parks a certain limitation on 
permitted activities, but forest advocates justified them as “necessary and 
functional entities,” with a greater variety of activities permitted than in national 
parks.37 With the Forest Service's formation, the Secretary of Agriculture sent a 
memorandum to Pinchot (probably, in fact, written by Pinchot) that included a 
sentence summarizing the purpose of the forest reserves: “All the resources of the 
35 Concerns over destruction of the San Gabriel Mountains watershed by ranching and mining 
activities served as one source for creation of the reserves. See Ronald F. Lockmann, Guarding 
the Forests of Southern California: Evolving Attitudes toward Conservation of Watershed,  
Woodlands, and Wilderness (Glendale, Calif.: Arthur H. Clark, 1981).
36 Dilsaver and Tweed, 98-99.
37 Godfrey, 37. The sale of timber was foremost a crucial difference between parks and forests.
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forests are for use, under such restrictions only as will insure…permanence….”38 
Indeed, for most of their existence national forests have functioned on a “multiple 
use” philosophy that puts logging, grazing, and—later—recreation on an equal 
footing.
While the functional organizations of national parks in California came 
before national forests (in 1890, with the creation of Yosemite, Sequoia, and 
General Grant), Congress did not create a National Park Service until 1916. Prior 
to then, the War Department managed the three parks for the Department of the 
Interior. Park Service historian Richard Sellars argues that from Yellowstone 
onward, national parks operated on the concept that “development for public use 
and enjoyment could foster nature preservation on large tracts of public lands.”39 
This philosophy of emphasizing recreation over consumptive resource use served 
as a defining difference between the Park Service and the Forest Service. 
Although Chief Forester Henry Graves initially supported a separate bureau for 
national parks, he later desired to incorporate them into Forest Service 
management. He realized, however, that the Service's multiple-use mission could 
not shield it from conservationist arguments that the Service might permit 
logging, grazing, or summer home development.40
While the Forest Service under Pinchot moved aggressively to institute its 
control over the forest lands, the national parks had no such strong parent within 




the Department of the Interior. The Sierra Club saw the lack of clear 
administration for the park lands as a key reason for the flooding of Hetch 
Hetchy Valley in Yosemite National Park for San Francisco's water supply.41 
Conservationists recognized the Forest Service's rising power and lobbied for an 
organization devoted to the national parks—as much to protect them as to keep 
them from being absorbed by the extraction-oriented Forest Service.42 Protection 
of scenic qualities of the park lands, conservationists believed, would come about 
only if an agency held that as its mandate.43 As far back as the 1910s, then, the 
Sierra Club engaged in lobbying (here, for creation of the Park Service) and 
grasped how two warring natural resource agencies could benefit the 
conservationist cause.
The Forest Service immediately saw these efforts (in the middle years of 
the 1910s) as threatening its operations. Pinchot “steadfastly opposed the concept 
of a parks bureau” and had the Forest Service voice its objections about the 
Organic Act to create an agency for the national parks.44 The Forest Service lost 
this battle, as Congress established the National Park Service on August 25, 1916. 
The strong leadership of Stephen Mather, a California businessman who made 
his fortune in borax, as first director of the Park Service, caused friction between 
the two agencies but resulted in greater protection for Sierran lands.
41 Michael P. Cohen, The History of the Sierra Club, 1892-1970 (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 
1988), 32.




Although the Forest and Park services eyed each other warily, they at least 
cooperated to some degree in the 1920s. Realizing that while neighboring parks 
and forests might be administratively distinct, they were not biological islands 
unto themselves, the Forest Service agreed to protect national park entrance 
areas within national forests and to control grazing and timbering operations 
near park borders. Additionally, the two agencies agreed to review national forest 
lands to determine which areas should be transferred to national parks.45 In 1926, 
Sequoia National Park expanded eastward, but only after sometimes-contentious 
negotiations. The Park Service traded three southern townships of the existing 
park (consisting of timber lands) for this other land to the east, including Mount 
Whitney. The compromises between the Park and Forest Services and other users 
of the forest (such as hydroelectric interests) excluded the Kings River canyon 
and the Mineral King valley from the expanded national park.46
But the cooperative spirit of the two agencies soon faded as the Forest 
Service grew hostile to Mather's unendingly aggressive approach of expanding 
and bureaucratically fortifying the national parks and the Park Service.47 The 
Park Service's growing strength and focus on preservation and recreation so 
encroached on Forest Service dominion that wilderness areas began to appear in 
the national forests. The Forest Service, in recognizing the potential threat posed 
by the Park Service, implemented some recreation programs almost as soon as 
45 Godfrey, 176.
46 Dilsaver and Tweed, 115, 117-118.
47 Godfrey, 176.
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the Park Service was created. In a 1918 report commissioned by the Forest 
Service titled “Recreation Uses on the National Forests,” Frank A. Waugh 
concluded that recreation should be on par with the other “uses” of national 
forest lands.48 In seeking to differentiate the still-insecure Park Service from the 
Forest Service, Mather derided the Forest Service as engaging in the “commercial 
exploitation of natural resources,” while the National Park Service operated 
“national playgrounds.”49 In order to stand its ground against Mather, the Forest 
Service developed a program of wilderness areas on its lands. Beginning with the 
1924 designation of the Gila Wilderness in New Mexico, the regional initiatives 
program became national in character in the ensuing years. If the Park Service 
sought to gain control of forest lands to protect their wild qualities, the thinking 
went, then offering these lands the same sort of wilderness protection under 
Forest Service administration should diffuse the land-transfer efforts. The back-
and-forth about the proper agency to oversee recreation thus helped to protect a 
far greater area of the Sierra Nevada than would have otherwise been the case, 
but also served to, in the words of Forest Service historian Anthony Godfrey, 
48 Ibid., 151. Waugh was a trained landscape architect who in 1913 wrote the influential book 
Landscape Gardening. Waugh taught landscape architecture at Massachusetts State College, and 
through his student Conrad Wirth, a future Park Service director, had “substantial impact” on the 
Service from the 1930s until 1964, when Wirth retired. (Linda Flint McClelland, Presenting 
Nature: The Historic Landscape Design of the National Park Service, 1916-1942 (n.p.: National 
Park Service, 1993), accessed online at 




“perpetuate the bureaucratic rivalry” and make future interactions between the 
two agencies difficult to impossible.50
The idea to include Kings River canyon in a national park was part of John 
Muir's original vision for Sequoia National Park, proposed as a wilderness park 
by Bob Marshall of The Wilderness Society, and pushed to conclusion by Franklin 
Roosevelt's Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes.51 The effort to include the 
Kings River canyon in a national park further strained relations between the 
Forest and Park services, but resulted in stringent wilderness protection for the 
area. In contrast to many other parks created from lands deemed “worthless” for 
minerals, timber, agriculture, and water resources, some Central Valley citizens 
thought the Kings River canyon contained significant hydroelectric potential.52 
The Forest Service, mindful of its multiple use mandate and desiring to please 
both “development and preservation interests,”53 simultaneously planned a large 
development at Cedar Grove and large primitive areas on the South and Middle 
Forks. A strong wilderness proponent, Ickes tried to create a wilderness preserve 
called John Muir-Kings Canyon National Park in this area.54 Although this 
Congressional bill—viciously opposed by development interests—failed to make it 
50 Godfrey, 57-58.
51 For an account of the park struggle, see Dilsaver and Tweed, 197-225. For Bob Marshall's 
contribution, see Cohen, 82.
52 Dilsaver and Tweed, 197.
53 Ibid., 202.
54 Ickes's park philosophy differed rather dramatically from that of Mather. In May 1933 Ickes 
said, “If I had my way about national parks, I would create one without a road in it. I would have 
it impenetrable forever to automobiles, a place where man would not try to improve upon God.” 
(Ibid., 204.)
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out of committee, Ickes continued to pursue the park plan. Because the Forest 
Service had played no small part in fostering local resentment of the Park Service 
(cultivating a fear that park expansion would “lock up” lands), the Park Service 
had to repair its image. Although Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace (on 
Roosevelt's orders) expressed support for the new park, California members of 
the Forest Service, led by Stuart Show, engaged in very public remonstrations 
against the park—and against the Park Service. Sequoia park historians Lary 
Dilsaver and William Tweed write that the 1940 creation of Kings Canyon 
National Park “ended a sixty-year conservation struggle, one nearly unrivaled for 
rancorous debate, emotional character assassination, and political wheeling and 
dealing.”55 Although much of this occurred with and between development 
interests, the Park and Forest Services publicly and at times viciously squabbled 
over the park proposal.
Changes in the administration of national forests in the southern Sierra 
Nevada in the 1960s reawakened the longstanding tensions between the two 
agencies. At this time, administrators of Sequoia and Kings Canyon National 
Parks reassessed the status of their backcountry lands, devoting greater attention 
to the lands and affording more wilderness protection. Simultaneously, the 
administrators of national forests surrounding the parks increased logging of the 
forest lands. Though utilized for timber and grazing purposes, the forest lands 
remained largely as they were when the national forests were established more 
than half a century earlier. But the 1960s ushered in a Forest Service more 
55 Ibid., 212-214.
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determined to fulfill its multiple use mandate. The Forest Service built many new 
roads that increased the amount of logging—much of it in the form of 
clearcutting. The western portions of the Minaret Summit road, which can still be 
driven today, were built by logging companies on bids invited by the Service. 
Dilsaver and Tweed note that the Forest Service had changed neither direction 
nor policy, but merely faithfully executed the original Forest Service mandate. 
“What had changed was the need for the forests' resources and the ability of the 
Forest Service to implement development schemes,” they write, and these 
schemes included recreational developments.56
Much as the Forest Service expanded the intensity and size of other uses, 
so too did it now advocate large recreational developments for both skiing and 
year-round recreation. Sierra Nevada environmental historian David Beesley 
writes that “in doing so it demonstrated its commitment to projects heavily 
dependent on private corporate investment, automobile connections, and very 
little consideration of environmental effects.”57 The rise of recreation as an 
important Sierran land use is demonstrated in the history of the Sierra Nevada 
written in 1965 by Francis Farquhar, a mountaineer and Sierra Club President. 
The book concludes with a chapter entitled “Utilization and Recreation,” 
explaining how such uses had come to predominate and capped with a nod to the 
modern development of skiing in the range.58 Though both the Park Service and 
56 Ibid., 278, 280.
57 Beesley, 203.
58 Farquhar, History of the Sierra Nevada, 239-245.
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the Sierra Club accepted earlier developments, the much greater scale of the 
1960s proposals, including and exemplified by the Mineral King development, 
alarmed environmentalists—especially because Mineral King could well have 
been added to Sequoia National Park in the past and enjoyed protection as a 
“National Game Refuge.”
The controversy over Mineral King resulted directly from the placement of 
the valley and environs in Sequoia National Forest rather than in Sequoia 
National Park; if the Forest Service had not administered the area, it could not 
have proposed such a massive recreation development. The original legislation 
left Mineral King out of the park created in 1890, but conservationists and the 
Park Service clearly considered Mineral King for the 1926 expansion of Sequoia 
National Park, when the park acquired large areas to the south and east. The 
mining history and multiple private uses of the basin complicated the proposition 
of adding the valley and surrounding mountainsides to the national park.
The Sierra Club played a part in this legislative effort, just as it earlier 
participated in legislation creating the National Park Service. Francis Farquhar 
later remarked that, in 1926, Mineral King was “already not of a national 
character.” Because of the private land inholdings and the mining claims (gained 
through lax enforcement of rules), the Sierra Club and Park Service found it 
simpler to keep the valley within the forest than to try to eliminate the private 
ownership. “It was by common consent that we let Mineral King stay out,” 
Farquhar said.59 But the area had definite geographic ties to the newly created 
59 Francis P. Farquhar, “Sierra Club Mountaineer and Editor,” an oral history conducted in 1974 
by Ann and Ray Lage, in Sierra Club Reminiscences I, 1900s-1960, Sierra Club Oral History 
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park lands. The East Fork of the Kaweah River ran out of the valley and through 
Sequoia National Park—as did the only access road. The area stuck out like a sore 
thumb, and sat surrounded by the park on the west, north, and east. Due to this 
inextricable relationship between Mineral King and surrounding areas—and 
taking into account the land ownership situation—Congress designated the area 
as a Game Refuge.60 Michael McCloskey, who succeeded David Brower as the 
Sierra Club's Executive Director in 1969 and led the litigation over Mineral King, 
later stated, “in terms of adequate or sensible park boundaries, the enclave 
simply didn't make any sense. It was just an historical accident from the debates 
of the 1920s.”61 Historical accident or not, Mineral King's administrative 
disposition—resulting from a legislative decision—played a key role in allowing 
development proposals to proceed. This was one of several instances in the Club's 
history where the Club supported a Sierra Nevada land management decision 
that it later opposed. But in the 1920s and 1930s, a much bigger threat existed to 
Sierran wilderness than the exclusion of Mineral King from the park: a 
recreational road connecting the high points throughout the range.
Series, Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 
1974, 29-30.
60 Dilsaver and Tweed, 118, 280. Though the Sierra Club and the Forest Service later tusseled over 
the meaning of this appellation, it was meant to protect wildlife in the area, which freely and 
unwittingly moved between forest and park lands.
61 McCloskey, 174.
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A Road the Length of the Mountains: The Sierra Way
Just as the Blue Ridge Parkway (and its northern end, Skyline Drive 
through Shenandoah National Park) was being constructed along the backbone of 
the Appalachians in the East, chambers of commerce and other interests saw 
potential for an 800-mile-long road running the length of the Sierra Nevada, with 
spurs to provide access to various natural wonders and recreational areas along 
the way.62 It began in the mid-1920s as a more modest 200-mile “park-to-park” 
highway (or Sierra National Parks Highway) originating at Isabella in Kern 
County and connecting Sequoia and General Grant (the predecessor to Kings 
Canyon) National Parks with Yosemite, the northern terminus. The boosters were 
careful to note that the road did not approach the wilderness areas (which lay 
“miles to the east”), while also pointing out that roads originating on the valley 
floor extended further to the east than the proposed routing of this highway.63 
Nothing was realized of this initial plan (although it did coincide with 
construction of the Generals Highway through Sequoia National Park). In 1932, 
however, a much more serious proposal came to light for a road running the 
length of the Sierra. The road would be accomplished by improving existing roads 
and construction of comparatively little connecting mileage. Colonel John White, 
62 The Blue Ridge Parkway connects Shenandoah National Park with Great Smoky Mountains 
National Park. For a history of the project, see Richard Quin, “Blue Ridge Parkway,” HAER No. 
NC,11-ASHV.V,2-, Historic American Engineering Record, National Park Service, U.S. 
Department of the Interior, 1997. Although the Sierra Way would not have involved dispossessing 
residents in the same way as happened for the Blue Ridge Parkway, Whisnant's Super-Scenic 
Motorway offers insight into the political construction of such a road.
63 “Mather, Albright Invited to View Sierra Road Plan,” Fresno Bee, February 27, 1927, p. 1.
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superintendent of Sequoia National Park from 1920 to 1947, believed the 
Generals Highway to have been the spark for the whole project.64 The territorial 
disputes involved in the Sierra Way discussions were emblematic of sometimes 
adversarial situations arising regularly in Sierran history.
The proposed Sierra Way ran through both national parks and national 
forests; the Forest Service championed the project and the Park Service initially 
viewed it with mixed emotions but came to adamantly oppose it. By the middle of 
the 1930s, the Park Service under Mather and Albright firmly embraced the idea 
of one main road for each park—and no more. The roads would sufficiently 
highlight chief scenic attractions, with much of the parks preserved as roadless 
wilderness.65 The Sierra Way, by virtue of the amount of new construction 
required through the parks, ran against this wilderness grain. Sequoia 
superintendent Colonel White “was one of the project's most powerful opponents, 
at least insofar as it affected his park.”66
Indeed, one of the routes advocated as part of the Sierra Way (outside of 
the Park Service) ran from Giant Forest to Mineral King on a totally new 
64 Dilsaver and Tweed, 182.
65 David Louter has investigated how the Park Service's road philosophy has changed through the 
years via Washington's national parks. Mount Rainier National Park, founded 1899, had roads 
pushed into its heart; Olympic National Park, founded 1938 but not developed with facilities until 
the 1950s, had only one road, built around the park's perimeter; and North Cascades National 
Park, established in 1968 after passage of the 1964 Wilderness Act, had no roads going to the 
park's principal attractions. See his Windshield Wilderness: Cars, Roads, and Nature in 
Washington's National Parks (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2006). 
Primarily because of the early emphasis on roads in parks, Paul Sutter argues that “national parks 
and wilderness areas were not one and the same thing—politically or aesthetically” (8). Various 
parks through the years, such as Kings Canyon and North Cascades, have come closer to the 
wilderness ideal than others.
66 Dilsaver and Tweed, 183.
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alignment. White and Colonel C. G. Thomson, superintendent of Yosemite, 
opposed the Sierra Way partly because it would undoubtedly rob money from 
other planned park roads.67 Park service landscape architects feared the aesthetic 
damage that would be visible from the scenic vista of Moro Rock. Sequoia park 
biologists worried of the road's effect on backcountry wildlife and vegetation. The 
Park Service found support in statements of the Sierra Club and the 
Commonwealth Club of California.68
The Park Service publicly tagged the project's cost as the factor in not 
going forward with the project, but both Director Cammerer and Superintendent 
White opposed the project for a number of reasons beyond economics. In 1936, 
White stated that the “opening up of this last great Sierra wilderness has 
ramifications which extend far beyond those of an ordinary scenic highway.”69 In 
their other justifications, they mentioned a pamphlet issued by the 
Commonwealth Club (titled “Should We Stop Building Roads into California's 
High Mountains?”), the Sierra Club's views, and their views on the importance of 
wilderness.70 Only a few parts of the length of the road were ever built, and 
despite revived congressional interest in the 1960s, it did not further seriously 
threaten the southern Sierra. While the Sierra Club and National Park Service 
shared the view that the Sierra Way would have a destructive influence on Sierran 
67 “Valley Chambers Oppose Plan for High Sierra Way,” Fresno Bee, March 13, 1936, p. B1.
68 Dilsaver and Tweed, 183.
69 “Valley Chambers,” Fresno Bee.
70 Dilsaver and Tweed, 185.
34
wilderness, they diverged sharply over improvement of the Tioga Road in 
Yosemite National Park.
An Improved Road Threatens the Wild: The Tioga Road
The National Park Service, in particular, has been closely associated with 
the Sierra Club. Aside from the activities of John Muir and other early members 
in securing establishment of Yosemite National Park, the first Park Service 
directors themselves had been Sierra Club members. Stephen Mather, a 
University of California graduate and Sierra Club member beginning 1904, 
lobbied Secretary of the Interior Franklin K. Lane for a separate agency for 
managing national parks, contributing to the 1916 founding of the Park Service 
and Mather's elevation to be its Director. Upon Mather's death in 1930, the 
Sierra Club Bulletin printed that upon assuming these responsibilities “he turned 
first of all to the Sierra Club for support of his program. Always in his work for 
the parks he made a point of identifying himself with us – not as an honorary 
vice-president, but as a plain member.” Horace M. Albright, Mather's assistant, 
stand-in during Mather's illness, and Park Service Director from 1929 to 1933, 
was also a Sierra Club member.71 While the two organizations had minor 
differences through the years, the changing Club had its first great rupture with 
the Park Service over 1950s plans to improve the Tioga Road, as the Club itself 
struggled to define how much access was appropriate.
71 Sierra Club, “John Muir Exhibit: Stephen T. Mather,” 
http://www.sierraclub.org/john_muir_exhibit/frameindex.html?
http://www.sierraclub.org/john_muir_exhibit/people/mather.html (accessed April 11, 2008).
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Like the wagon roads detailed earlier, the Tioga Pass road can trace its 
origins to miners' dreams of bonanza. Its history, however, is uniquely tied to the 
creation of the National Park Service and especially the design of national park 
roads. Its later improvements in the 1950s, vociferously opposed by many Sierra 
Club members—notably photographer Ansel Adams—foreshadowed debate over 
Mission 66 infrastructure modernization throughout the national park system. In 
a story similar to its Minaret Summit highway and Mineral King resort 
opposition, the Sierra Club early encouraged improvement of the road for 
automobile use. Plans in the early 1930s called for upgrades of the road in three 
sections. While the sections at either end of the road were paved by 1938, nothing 
then happened to the middle section.72 Funding for its improvement came as part 
of the Mission 66 package, but recreational demands and environmental 
concerns had changed sufficiently in the intervening decades to cause the Sierra 
Club concern. Over objections of many Club leaders, the realigned road's path led 
directly across glacially carved granite of the High Sierra.
Mining activities in the area of Tioga Pass took off in the year 1878, 
prompting construction of what eventually became known as the Tioga Road. 
Undertaken by owners of the Great Sierra Consolidated Silver Company, the road 
was unlike ones to Yosemite Valley. Those roads served the tourists, but the Great 
72 Ethan Carr, Mission 66: Modernism and the National Park Dilemma, (Amherst: University of 
Massachusetts Press in Association with the Library of American Landscape History, 2007), 257-
258. This inaction was partly due to the philosophy of the wartime leader of the Park Service, 
Newton B. Drury (1940-1951), who stood in marked contrast to the previous directors. National 
park historian Richard West Sellars writes that Drury “did not fit the mold of the previous 
directors, who enthusiastically boosted park development and expansion of Service programs” 
(150). Drury was mindful that the Park Service was unlikely to have large funds appropriated, at 
any rate, and assured the Sierra Club, “We have no money; we can do no harm.” (Sellars, 174.)
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Sierra Wagon Road (as it was first known) served the miners. Amazingly 
constructed in less than six months, between April and September 1883, the 56-
mile road connected Crocker's Station on the west with the Tioga mining district. 
It did not continue fully across the mountains, but did connect with several trails 
that descended the eastern slope. The mining boom, as history might have 
suggested, did not last long, running out in 1888. This left the road poorly 
maintained, but still used occasionally by the hardy traveler. The road remained 
under private control even with Yosemite's establishment as a national park in 
1890.73
The state of the road caused the federal government to investigate 
acquiring and improving the road. In 1909, the Sierra Club expressed its desire 
for repairs so as to “afford one of the most wonderful trans-mountain roads in the 
world.” But the actual purchase did not come until Stephen Mather himself raised 
money, with the help of the Club and others, and donated some of his own to the 
effort. After enabling legislation passed Congress, Mather conveyed the road to 
the federal government. The Tioga Road itself was hardly suitable for 
automobiles, but that did not discourage intrepid parkgoers. While the Park 
Service repaired and made small improvements to the road, not until increased 
traffic of the 1920s did officials seriously consider a larger program of 
realignment and improvement.74 The 1931 plan for the road's future divided it 
73 Richard H. Quin, “Tioga Road (Great Sierra Wagon Road),” HAER No. CAL,22-YOSEM,6-, 
Historic American Engineering Record, National Park Service, U.S. Department of the Interior, 
1997, 2-5.
74 “Tioga Road,” 8-10, 12.
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into three sections; while the two end segments had been paved by 1938, the 
middle section remained untouched. When money for this middle section of the 
road came as part of Mission 66, the project became that program's most 
controversial project.75
National park roads had not always been such contentious entities. The 
public clamored for automobile access to the national parks early in the twentieth 
century, most famously in regards to Yosemite National Park in 1912.76 With 
formation of the National Park Service in 1916, along with Mather's energetic, 
automobile tourism-oriented leadership, roads became an integral part of the 
parks.77 This development boom continued through the 1920s, but saw 
opposition develop in the 1930s. The Wilderness Society organized in opposition 
to roads like these in the natural areas. The Sierra Way on the west coast ran into 
opposition from the Park Service itself. On the East Coast, the Park Service began 
the politically contentious Blue Ridge Parkway.78 Park roads under Mather 
reflected the parkway ideal—slow-speed roads crafted to their environments. But 
as Timoth Davis points out, the parkway fell out of fashion as “the public became 
75 Carr, Mission 66, 257-258.
76 Louter, 24-25. Automobile groups and commercial organizations pressured Secretary of the 
Interior Walter L. Fisher at the national parks conference held in Yosemite in 1912, and the next 
year new Secretary Franklin K. Lane lifted the ban.
77 Ibid., 36-40.
78 Opposition to the Blue Ridge Parkway differed from other park roads in that it came mostly 
from affected residents, rather than environmentalists or other outside interests. (Anne Mitchell 
Whisnant, “The Scenic Is Political: Creating Natural and Cultural Landscapes along America's 
Blue Ridge Parkway,” in The World Beyond the Windshield: Roads and Landscapes in the 
United States and Europe, ed. Christof Mauch and Thomas Zeller (Athens: Ohio University Press, 
2008), 68.)
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enamored of high-speed motorways.”79 The Tioga Road improvement was caught 
between diverging strands of thought on roads: environmentalists on the one 
hand questioned any road construction, while the public began to demand higher 
standards and faster speeds for park roads, to which the Park Service responded 
with an improved Tioga Road.
As I have pointed to elsewhere, changes in recreational tourism, 
accessibility, population, and environmental thinking contributed to altering the 
Sierra Club's views on an improved road. The controversy over whether or not to 
reconstruct the road symbolized the opposition to Mission 66 projects as a whole, 
which sought to fix aging facilities and providing for the increasing numbers of 
tourists already visiting the parks and those projected in the future. Though the 
Tioga Road was, well, obviously a road, Ethan Carr notes that it was sufficiently 
antiquated that its corridor contained “remote, relatively unvisited areas of the 
park.”80 As with other Sierran automobile road proposals in which opposition 
arose, the argument became one centered on wilderness. The Sierra Club and 
National Park Service had formerly shared many goals for the national parks, but 
they diverged sharply as the Park Service moved away from the parkway and the 
Sierra Club moved toward wilderness. The advocacy of the Club for protecting 
Sierran lands now came in the form of antagonism toward the Park Service and 
Forest Service, as we will see with Minaret Summit and Mineral King.
79 Davis, 55.
80 Carr,  Mission 66, 266.
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Fig. 2: Tioga Road, 2008. The improved road cut directly across the glacially 
carved granite. Photograph by the author.
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Chapter 4: The Sierra Club Reverses Course: Opposition to 
Minaret Summit and Mineral King
By the time the Minaret Summit highway and Mineral King development 
controversies gained serious traction in the 1960s, each had been proposed and 
discussed for decades. San Joaquin Valley businessmen first proposed a crossing 
in the vicinity of Minaret Summit in the early years of the twentieth century; the 
winter sports potential of Mineral King gained official recognition in the 1940s. 
Though the proposals changed form somewhat through the years, the heart of 
each idea was born in a different environmental time when effects on the natural 
environment did not receive significant attention. San Joaquin Valley citizens 
came up with a proposal for direct highway outlet to the East at the same time 
other Valley communities proposed their own roads, like a Porterville-Lone Pine 
road further south. As recreational skiing in the United States took off following 
World War II, particularly in national forests, skiing interests conceptualized a 
Mineral King operation in line with other facilities at the time: perhaps a few tow 
ropes and some overnight cabins.81 The Sierra Club, with several skiers in 
leadership positions within the club, endorsed such a development. 
Unfortunately for the developers and promoters, the landscape shifted between 
the initial ideas and serious attempts at construction. As the amount of 
81 Annie Gilbert Coleman has written about the culture and history of skiing in Colorado in Ski 
Style: Sport and Culture in the Rockies (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas), 2004. The 
development of recreational skiing in California mirrors that of Colorado, from the development 
of nascent ski areas in the 1930s to the modern destination ski areas of the 1960s.
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development in the Sierra Nevada grew, along with infrastructure elsewhere in 
the West and the population in California, opposition arose from both groups like 
the Sierra Club and in the public consciousness more generally. In addition to 
competing against similar projects, the Minaret Summit highway and Mineral 
King development fell victim to shrinking wild areas and growing public concern 
over environmental protection. Though proponents of each argued that 
wilderness was a non-issue to these projects because of previous legislative 
decisions, much of the public fight turned on the wilderness quality of the land. 
The Sierra Club's defense of Mineral King served as a seminal event in 
environmental history, because it involved the environmental movement's 
attempts to secure executive, judicial, and legislative solutions in the struggle.82 
For both Minaret Summit and Mineral King, re-designation (as wilderness and 
national parkland, respectively) served as the official nail in the coffin to 
development prospects.
In 1937, as the lesser of two evils, the Sierra Club agreed to a Mammoth 
Pass crossing as preferable to a Lone Pine-Porterville road. The practical 
consequence of this agreement, a non-wilderness gap between two legislatively 
82 The Sierra Club had, of course, engaged in executive and legislative lobbying since the early 
1900s. As described elsewhere in this paper, the Club had constant interaction with the Park 
Service and Forest Service. On the legislative front, the Club had opposed the 1913 Raker Act 
authorizing the dam in Hetch Hetchy, had lobbied for other national park legislation, and helped 
to secure passage of the 1964 Wilderness Act. In Beauty, Health, and Permanence, Samuel Hays 
argues that beginning in the late 1960s environmentalists became more interested in resolving 
disputes at the administrative level. Although they used all three branches of government, Hays 
argues, “administrative politics was even more intense than legislative politics” (Beauty, Health,  
and Permanence: Environmental Politics in the United States, 1955-1985 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1987), 469). What the Mineral King fight reveals, however, is that 
environmental groups could make use of all branches of government to achieve their desired 
goals.
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created wilderness areas, later served as justification that the road corridor itself 
did not possess wilderness quality. The 1920s expansion of Sequoia National Park 
left out the Mineral King basin (and, as seen, designated it a “Game Refuge” 
under Forest Service administration) because of complicated land ownership and 
the evidence of past mining activities. On a map, a finger of Forest Service land 
jutted north into an area otherwise surrounded by the national park. Although a 
legislatively produced line on a map does not produce wilderness, development 
proponents utilized these previous legislative decisions as definitive referendums 
on the wilderness quality of the areas. The Sierra Club and other interested 
individuals attacked the economic necessity of the projects and their effects on 
the natural environment. Although the development proponents did not wish to 
admit it, the road fights of the 1960s were about wilderness and the legislative 
actions taken in response to these controversies changed the administrative 
landscape. In wilderness terms, the 1960s are notable for 1964 passage of the 
Wilderness Act, which legally defined wilderness and created more stringent 
protection for previously designated areas. The Mineral King and Minaret 
Summit stories reveal the conflicted nature of wilderness thinking in the United 
States—not only because the Sierra Club fought against development interests, 
but because the Sierra Club also fought against itself. 
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Minaret Summit
The Sierra Nevada has no automobile crossings between Tioga Pass and 
Walker Pass, a distance of 270 miles. In the winter, four of the northern crossings
—Tioga Pass, Sonora Pass, Ebbetts Pass, and Carson Pass—close from the first 
snowfall until spring brings sufficient melting to allow the California Department 
of Transportation to plow the roads.83 The closure of these central Sierran routes 
means the Sierran road barrier extends another 75 miles in the winter, extending 
to U.S. 50 and southern Lake Tahoe. Minaret Summit and Mammoth Pass both 
lie around twenty to twenty-five miles southeast of Tioga Pass, to the west of the 
ski town of Mammoth Lakes.84 In the area of Mammoth Mountain, the crest of 
the Sierra Nevada dips slightly; this gap not only allows moist Pacific storms 
through to drop significant snow on the eastern side of the Sierra, but also 
suggested the location for a comparatively low crossing of the Sierra.
A Gap in the Wilderness
Although no organized movement for a crossing at Mammoth Pass existed 
in the 1930s, consideration for its eventual construction is evident in the 
83 For the Tioga Road, usually closed the longest, the average closing date is November 1 and the 
opening date is May 29. For a list of previous closures, see Mono Basin Clearinghouse, “Tioga 
Pass Road Opening and Closing Dates since 1933,” 
http://www.monobasinresearch.org/data/tiogapass.htm (accessed October 26, 2008). For a list 
of altitudes at which roads cross the Sierra Nevada, see Appendix A.
84 The road was originally known as the “Mammoth Pass Road,” because it was to cross the Sierra 
crest at Mammoth Pass. Later plans found the Minaret Summit crossing, several miles north and 
two hundred feet lower, to be a better route, and hence it became known as the “Minaret Summit 
Highway.” For this study, there is no practical difference between the two.
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Fig. 3: Sierran Snow Barrier, 1967. The gap represents the proposed road 
corridor. Reproduced from “Forest Highway 100 Study,” Prepared by Minaret 
Summit Coordinating Committee, Sisk Papers.
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designation of wild areas in the surrounding national forest land. Stimulated in 
part by the roadbuilding boom on national forest lands and also by attempts by 
the Park Service to grab forest lands, the Forest Service in 1926 designated 
several recreation areas throughout District 5 (California).85 Though envisioned 
as primarily protecting recreation values threatened by increasing road 
construction, the protection of natural areas from roads presages the formation 
and rallying of The Wilderness Society in the 1930s. The Sierra contained two of 
these seven recreation areas: around Echo Lake and Desolation Valley, southwest 
of Lake Tahoe in the Eldorado National Forest, and in Mono National Forest 
along Reversed Creek.86
The aggressive nature of the National Park Service in acquiring new lands 
for protection was a key element in stimulating the Forest Service to demonstrate 
a commitment for protection rather than use.87 Although the Forest Service had 
in 1925 initiated transfer of several areas from its control to Park Service 
administration, including Mount Whitney and parts of an enlarged Sequoia 
National Park, the Forest Service worried that the Park Service might continue 
raiding its lands. Formation of the California State Park system in 1928, 
accompanied by efforts to transfer forest lands to the State, further threatened 
the forest service. In response to these events, Chief Forester William B. Greeley 
85 Godfrey, 212-213.
86 Ibid., 212-213.
87 The expansion of Sequoia National Park, initiated by Mather upon assuming directorship of the 
Park Service and finalized in 1926, is one such example of this aggressive approach to park 
expansion. See Dilsaver and Tweed, 113-118, for a discussion of this expansion. 
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had all districts prepare proposals for “a system of wilderness areas,” free from 
roads and other developments.88 The Chief of District 5, Stuart Show, and his 
chief of lands, Louis A. Barrett, developed criteria for listing lands. A chief 
criterion was to only include those areas where there would be no necessity for 
future road building for forest administration purposes. Show and Barrett invited 
the participation of forest supervisors as well as Sierra Club members.89 On the 
national level, the 1929 L-20 regulation, amended several times in years 
following (including in 1930 changing the designation from wilderness areas to 
primitive areas) formalized the protection offered to these areas. The Sierra had 
six of these designated primitive areas. The two areas surrounding the road 
corridor were the 87,000-acre Mount Dana-Minarets Wild Area between 
Yosemite National Park and Devils Postpile National Monument (reduced to 
82,181 acres in 1931) and the 700,000-acre High Sierra Primitive Area, taking in 
lands in the Sierra, Sequoia, and Inyo national forests and increased to 825,899 
acres in 1931 (later renamed for John Muir).90 During the creation of these 
primitive areas, the Sierra Club tacitly allowed for a future trans-Sierra road.91 
This allowance is hardly surprising, for at the time the Club still functioned to 
render the mountains accessible. David Brower, who led the Sierra Club in the 




91 Dan K. Gordon, letter to the editor, Fresno Bee, May 19, 1957, p. 16-B.
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practically every pass in the Sierra…you name it, they wanted a road over it.”92 In 
December 1937, the Club explicitly endorsed a Bass Lake-Mammoth Pass route 
with a resolution by the Board of Directors.93
In a December 27, 1937 letter to Regional Forester Show, Sierra Club 
President Joel H. Hildebrand transmitted the December 4 resolution: “Moved 
that the Sierra Club go on record in recommending the substitution of the Bass 
Lake-Mammoth Pass route for a road across the Sierra in lieu of the proposed 
Porterville-Lone Pine route.”94 The letter provides ample justification for this 
crossing, but in the context that it be the only trans-Sierra road between Tioga 
Pass and Walker Pass. It characterizes the Mammoth Pass road as having 
“legitimate demand”; not seriously invading wilderness areas or passing through 
existing or proposed Primitive Areas; traversing a relatively less rugged area; and 
surrounded by areas ideal for recreational use. Thirty years later, when the Valley 
92 David R. Brower, Environmental Activist, Publicist, and Prophet, an oral history conducted 
1974-1978 by Susan Schrepfer, Sierra Club History Series, Regional Oral History Office, The 
Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1980, 180. This is an exaggeration, but it is 
telling of what Brower felt the Club advocated. Still, while the Sierra Club as an organization did 
not reverse its position vis a vis roads until the 1950s, prominent individuals within the Club had 
their own feelings on their desirability. Martin Litton, a Sierra Club Director in the 1960s and 
1970s and an uncompromising preservationist, in the 1930s worked against the proposed trans-
Sierra road between Porterville and Lone Pine. (Bettina Boxall, “A Matter of Grove Concern,” Los 
Angeles Times, December 21, 2006, A1.)
93 In light of The Wilderness Society's formation two years earlier, it may seem surprising that the 
Sierra Club would take such a position on the road. While the founders of the Society were able to 
rally around wilderness as the aim of the new organization, the forty-five-year-old Sierra Club had 
different concerns. The Club was still guided by its mission that included rendering the mountains 
accessible. Additionally, the Club did not itself propose the road, but accepted it as a lesser evil in 
furthering its conservation aims elsewhere in the range.
94 Letter to Phillip V. Sanchez, Administrative officer, County of Fresno from B. F. Sisk, May 13, 
1965, p. 3; Minarets Summit Hwy (Forest Hwy 100); B. F. (Bernie) Sisk Papers; Central Valley 
Political Archive, Henry Madden Library, California State University, Fresno. (Hereafter Sisk 
Papers.)
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population had further expanded, the Sierra Club disputed just how much 
demand a trans-Sierra route would have. But the justification offered by the Club 
in regards to the wilderness invasion is at odds with this later statements. The 
Club said the road over the summit (Minaret Summit) leading down to Devils 
Postpile meant that the area was already invaded—and therefore not wilderness. 
Because the trans-Sierra road does not go through the administratively 
designated primitive areas, wilderness did not suffer. The Club offered some 
practical justifications for the road, too: the fact that the route's topography 
provided an easy crossing allowed for the possibility of an all-year road. The 
western approach also provided favorable opportunities for both summer and 
winter activities.95
But this approval of the Mammoth road, and the justifications that it 
would not “seriously” invade wilderness, had a corollary: this would have to be 
the only crossing between the two passes. The concluding paragraph of the letter 
read, “The construction of a Bass Lake-Mammoth Highway should remove for all  
time any valid demand for any other road crossing the Sierra south of Tioga 
Pass. Such exclusion of other roads is of the greatest importance in order that 
these Primitive Areas be preserved” (emphasis in original).96 That Porterville-
Lone Pine link did not die, however. Incorporated into the State Highway System 
in 1933 but never fully constructed, the Porterville-Lone Pine road remained a 




State route in the Sierra Nevada.97 The Sierra Club endorsed the Mammoth Road 
as the lesser of two evils, preferring the Mammoth Pass road if there had to be 
any road at all. The realization that this acceptance did not stop further agitation 
for the Porterville-Lone Pine road, together with changes in the Sierran landscape 
in the intervening twenty years, caused the Sierra Club to reevaluate its earlier 
position.
Bernie F. Sisk and Ike Livermore: Access versus Wilderness
New rumblings for a trans-Sierra road extension in the vicinity of 
Mammoth Pass or Minaret Summit emerged in the 1950s.98 The Madera County 
Board of Supervisors and the California State Chamber of Commerce, among 
others, extolled the benefits of extending the existing forest road east, as the 
Forest Service called for bids to sell more lumber in the Chiquito Basin.99 Unlike 
the later Mineral King development, the Forest Service did not actively endorse 
this road crossing. The Forest Service only had road constructed to the edge of 
the area containing merchantable timber. This scenario still left around thirty 
97 “Sierra Access Is Stressed in Road Discussion,” Fresno Bee, January 8, 1959, p. 7-C.
98 Given the Sierra Club's early concession, this development was not new to them. Raymond 
Sherwin (Sierra Club President from 1971-1973) recalls that when he joined the Conservation 
Committee in the mid-1950s and headed up the opposition to the Mammoth Pass Road, he went 
through “one and a half filing cabinets full of material” on the problem. (Raymond J. Sherwin, 
“Conservationist, Judge, and Sierra Club President, 1960s-1970s,” an oral history conducted in 
1980-1981 by Ann Lage, in Sierra Club Leaders, 1950s-1970s, Sierra Club History Series, 
Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1982, 17.)
99 Karl Kidder, “Board Sees Need to Extend Road,” Fresno Bee, August 15, 1953, p. 3-B; 
“Lumbering to Extend Pass Road,” Los Angeles Times, December 22, 1954, p. A7; “Trans-Sierra 
Highway Plan Is Discussed,” Reno Evening Gazette, July 7, 1956, p. 6.
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miles to be constructed through whatever funds its proponents could secure. 
Because it would consume such a large portion of the forest highway funds for 
many years, Congressman Bernie F. Sisk of the Central Valley attempted adding 
the road to the interstate highway system. Sisk hoped to extend Interstate 70 
from its western terminus of Fort Cove, Utah, through Nevada, and westward 
across the Sierra Nevada. As an interstate, the federal government would provide 
90% of the road's cost, hastening prospects for its completion.
But as Sisk and other boosters sought to convince the Forest Service, the 
U.S. Bureau of Public Roads, and the State Department of Transportation of the 
road's utility, they also had to wage a public relations campaign against the Sierra 
Club. The Sierra Club in the 1930s stated that the road did not affect wilderness 
qualities, but this did not forestall this later debate on the road from turning on 
the question of wilderness. The proponents argued—as the Sierra Club had in 
earlier years—that the road went between wilderness areas and it was thus a non-
issue; the Sierra Club and others, besides refuting other rationales given for the 
road, brought the discussion back to wilderness.
Unlike the Sierra Club's emerging leaders, who were coming to see the 
Sierra as too accessible to the recreation-seekers, Sisk did not believe that the 
Sierra offered enough opportunities for Central Valley recreation-seekers. Sisk 
argued that the “heart” of the battle over the road concerned “whether outdoor 
recreation should be reserved for the rich or should be made available to those 
who have to be careful of how they spend their money.”100 If they did not build the 
100 Letter to Frank A. Cecere from B. F. Sisk, January 28, 1970; Minarets Summit Hwy (Forest 
Hwy 100); Sisk Papers.
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road, Sisk believed, families could be shut out of recreation areas because of 
overcrowding. The Sierra would effectively be “locked up” so that only those able 
to afford a pack trip could see “the beauties of these mountains.”101 Although Sisk 
spent most of his road advocacy playing up the advantages of the road as a 
through highway—as for defense purposes (an escape route for Central Valley 
residents in case of Cold War attack), to cut down travel time for Central Valley 
residents to point east, to make it cheaper to ship Central Valley produce to the 
east—he also justified it for its recreation potential. Sisk's endorsement of it as 
opening up the mountains hearkens back to earlier arguments by the Sierra Club 
advocating other roads into the Sierra.
In a 1971 letter to a Fresno businessman, Sisk admitted that the road might 
be difficult to justify “on merely a commercial basis.” But he argued road could 
provide a “reasonable opportunity” for families of “modest incomes” to enjoy the 
mountain scenery. Sisk wrote that he enjoyed non-automobile trips into the 
backcountry, backpacking and packing, but recognized that the majority of 
people did not have the time or financial means to do that on a regular basis—or 
at all.102 Sisk's correspondence on the subject is peppered with such concerns for 
his constituents' access to outdoor recreation. Even a modest highway open only 
in the summer, he declared, could fulfill the necessary function of getting people 
101 Letter to Scott M. Kruse from B. F. Sisk, November 25, 1969; Minarets Summit Hwy (Forest 
Hwy 100); Sisk Papers.
102 Letter to C. W. Bonner, President, Bonner Packing Company, from B. F. Sisk, March 29, 1971;, 
pp. 2-3; Minarets Summit Hwy (Forest Hwy 100); Sisk Papers.
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“into the Sierras [sic] and see what they are like.”103 He was particularly 
concerned that areas on the range's western side could become, or were already 
becoming, overcrowded. Citing the growing numbers of people expected to 
populate the Central Valley, Sisk stressed that the region needed to make better 
use of natural resources; if it did not, the great overcrowding could hurt existing 
recreation areas.104 Allowing Central Valley residents easy access to the eastern 
Sierra could relieve the pressure on Yosemite and Sequoia-Kings Canyon 
National Parks.105 In addition to helping already overcrowded recreation ares, 
Sisk believed that the road posed no threat to Sierran wilderness.
In 1963, the Department of Agriculture enlarged and reclassified the 
former Minarets Wild Area as the Minarets Wilderness. Sisk welcomed this new 
status for the area, hailing it as “one of the most beautiful and secluded areas in 
our mountain country of California,” but also emphasizing that the action would 
not interfere with the “needed highway.”106 Sisk, then, simultaneously advocated 
both wilderness protection and roads for access, while the Sierra Club felt the 
balance was already tilted too much toward access.107 He recognized the value of 
103 Letter to Virginia Reid, San Joaquin Valley Information Service, from B. F. Sisk, March 17, 
1970, p. 2; Minarets Summit Hwy (Forest Hwy 100); Sisk Papers.
104 Letter to John C. Kluczynski, Chairman, Subcommittee on Roads, Committee on Public Works, 
from B. F. Sisk, May 21, 1970, pp. 2-3; Minarets Summit Hwy (Forest Hwy 100); Sisk Papers.
105 Letter to Mr. and Mrs. Harold Snyder from B. F. Sisk, August 6, 1971; Minarets Summit Hwy 
(Forest Hwy 100); Sisk Papers.
106 “US Gives Minarets Wilderness Status,” Fresno Bee, August 20, 1963, p. 1. This was part of a 
process that affected twenty national forest wilderness areas in California “that often involved 
simply adjusting boundaries to arrive at workable administrative units.” (Godfrey, 411.)  The 
designation was still an administrative classification made by the Forest Service and did not offer 
any greater protections.
107 Sisk admitted as much in a letter to a constituent: “The key to the differing views between the 
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wilderness areas and did not feel the road presented a threat to wilderness, as 
when he wrote that “the Minarets Summit highway would not encroach on any 
wilderness area.”108 The area set aside for the highway, wrote Sisk, could not be 
considered primitive, because there had been “too much encroachment” to 
preserve any primitive characteristics.109
The Sierra Club recognized that they had to counter several arguments put 
forth about the road, but wilderness and access predominated. Norman “Ike” 
Livermore perhaps felt this juxtaposition most keenly. Beginning his career as a 
pack train operator and later a director of the Sierra Club, Livermore served as 
secretary of resources for all eight years under Governor Ronald Reagan (1967-
1975). He brought “a conservation stance” to the Reagan administration “that 
neither friend nor foe had anticipated.”110 His influence on Reagan contributed to 
major environmental victories during this time. In addition to halting the 
Minaret Summit and Mineral King roads, the Reagan administration stopped the 
Dos Rios Dam, which would have flooded Round Valley in Northern California.
Sierra Club and I, I believe, is in the third paragraph of your letter, wherein you say that the Sierra 
Club policy of rendering the Sierra accessible has been dropped because it is now too accessible. 
This is a viewpoint with which I am afraid I will continue to disagree. I do not believe the Sierra 
should be locked up so that only those who have enough money to pack in can get in to see the 
beauties of these mountains.” (Letter to Kruse, Sisk Papers.)
108 Letter to Snyders; Sisk Papers.
109 Letter to Bonner, p. 2; Sisk Papers.
110 Lou Cannon, Governor Reagan: His Rise to Power (New York: Public Affairs, 2003), 177-178. 
Livermore's staunch advocacy of wilderness should have surprised nobody, for he wrote his 
M.B.A. thesis on “The Economic Significance of California's Wilderness Areas” in 1936 and 
proposed a High Sierra Wilderness Conference in 1947, which was subsequently held in 1949. 
(Cohen, 122-127.)
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These legacies of Governor Reagan are not entirely attributable to 
Livermore. Lou Cannon, who wrote on both Governor and President Reagan, 
notes that Reagan was “usually responsive to natural beauty.”111 In September 
1966, Reagan had even voiced criticism of the California Highway Commission 
“for its tendency to go by the rule of the shortest distance between two points, 
regardless of what scenic wonder must be destroyed, to hold to that rule.”112 This 
helps to explain Reagan's executive decision to oppose the Minaret Highway. But 
Cannon also writes that, aside from air pollution, Reagan knew little about 
environmental issues. His environmental records as Governor and President are 
tied to his “custodians of natural resources.”113 Reagan was forceful in areas that 
had his interest—particularly on taxes and government—but otherwise leaned 
heavily on the advice of those serving him. Before Livermore's appointment as 
secretary of resources, he and Reagan did not know one another, but they hit it 
off on their first meeting, in part because of their shared affinity for horseback 
riding.114 Although for these environmental victories Reagan had to concur with 
Livermore's ideas, Livermore's active efforts at wilderness preservation loomed 
large during Reagan's years as governor.
111 Cannon, 303. The “unusual” corollary  was Reagan's belief that the redwoods along California's 
North Coast did not need additional park protection. The Sierra Club was not impressed with 
Reagan's environmental stances, and Reagan had the distinction of being the first political 
candidate whose election was openly opposed by the Sierra Club. (Cohen, 429.)
112 Cannon, 305.
113 Ibid., 299, 319. James Watt served as President Reagan's first Secretary of the Interior and 




According to friend and Sierra Club member Martin Litton, Livermore's 
obsession was “to keep the Sierra Nevada wild for the whole stretch from Tioga 
Pass in Yosemite National Park to Walker Pass. And that meant keeping the 
trans-Sierra roads out of there.”115 Livermore himself admitted to this passion in a 
1981-1982 oral history, noting that “if and when” he succeeded in getting the 
Minaret corridor legislatively closed, he could devote more time to social 
purposes.116 Livermore emerged as the key California state player in halting both 
the Minaret Summit road and the improved access road to Mineral King.
From his packing days, Livermore had a close emotional attachment to the 
Sierra Nevada. Livermore had an experience his second summer packing that 
shaped his crusade against roads in the Sierra. As Livermore remembered it, after 
a rough day on the trail, the head packer Frank Eggers let him know that they 
would end up that night
'in the most beautiful camp in the whole mountains.' But when we got into 
camp that night, there were automobiles! It was just like a stab in the heart 
you know. It was the year the road was just built....
Into Red's Meadow. Frank hadn't known it....we were told about this great 
Shangri-la place. It was called, I guess, Pumice Flats, and we came around the 
last turn, and there were these damned automobiles. It was dramatic, so I said 
to myself then, 'Well, if I could ever stop this road going any further, I'll do it.' 
Because it's a symbol, you know, it's the whole length of the Sierra, and 
unfortunately it's the lowest pass....that was the beginning of my feeling for 
stopping the road, because it was a shock, a real shock!
...Of course, there are two sides to this question; the automobiles probably 
thought it was great.117
115 Jane Kay, “'Ike' Livermore – environmentalist from Gold Rush family,” San Francisco 
Chronicle, December 8, 2006, B11.
116 Norman B. Livermore, Jr. Man in the Middle: High Sierra Packer, Timberman,  
Conservationist, and California Resources Secretary, an oral history conducted 1981-1982 by 
Ann Lage and Gabrielle Morris, Sierra Club History Series, Regional Oral History Office, The 
Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1983, 75.
117 Ibid., 93-94.
56
Whether or not it's true that a nineteen-year-old Livermore made a vow 
that he fulfilled some forty years later, the story brings out his feelings toward 
automobiles. But within the Reagan administration, Livermore's views were a 
minority opinion. Regarding wilderness particularly, Livermore felt he was the 
only person in the cabinet who had a wilderness orientation.118 This orientation 
earned the enmity of development advocates, particularly because of Livermore's 
ties to the Sierra Club and his apparent influence on Reagan's actions. In a letter 
to Larry Kiml of the California Chamber of Commerce, Sisk encourages Kiml to 
seek face time with Reagan to warn him of “the high price California is going to 
have to pay for the conservationist policies” being pursued by Livermore and his 
“Sierra Club cronies.”119 Proponents of the road made note of Livermore's close 
ties to the Sierran packers, which stood to suffer if the trans-Sierra road were 
completed.120
Though enthusiastic over wilderness, Livermore recognized his tenuous 
position. In addition to his outlier status on Reagan's staff, the road over Minaret 
Summit to Devils Postpile National Monument already existed. In trying to create 
momentum and gain support for an eventual crossing, these proponents tried to 
get this existing stub road brought up to a higher standard. Livermore knew he 
118 Ibid., 86.
119 Letter to Larry Kiml, Director, Natural & Water Resources Dept., California State Chamber of 
Commerce, from B. F. Sisk, December 15, 1969; Sisk Papers.
120 Livermore, in fact, in the 1930s and 1940s owned Mineral King land that Walt Disney 
Productions later purchased in its pursuit of a ski resort in the alpine valley. See Livermore, 14.
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could not very well argue for wilderness protection of that particular area, but he 
described the efforts to improve the existing road as like “a worm entering the 
apple to go all the way across.”121 Livermore's influence with Reagan, and 
Reagan's feeling for the wilderness, if not his overarching desire for its 
preservation, contributed to finally halting the road.
Closing the Gap
For years the Minaret Summit Road's status remained up in the air, as one 
committee, agency, or legislative body after another rendered its opinion on the 
desirability and necessity of the road. The U.S. Forest Service, U.S. Bureau of 
Public Roads, California State Department of Transportation, and the California 
State Legislature all rendered verdicts on this question, but Sisk felt the 
Legislature was key to the road's construction.122 Sisk attempted to get money for 
the road from the huge pot being devoted to construction of interstate highways, 
but this money was not available without the road's inclusion in the State 
highway system. The Forest Service had long tacitly allowed for a trans-Sierra 
road, which could piggyback on the logging roads on the western side and the 
road to Devils Postpile on the eastern side. At the end of 1971, the supervisors of 
121 Ibid., 87. The quotation suggests the despoiling effect of roads on natural areas.
122 No definitive or even partial history of the Minaret Summit Road struggle exists, so the 
positions of the various interested agencies through the years must be pieced together. The 
Bureau of Public Roads was the road's strongest proponent. Various members of the California 
State Legislature advocated the road, but the body itself only authorized studies. The California 
Department of Transportation issued a negative report on the road in 1966, and the U.S. Forest 
Service long took a neutral stance before coming out against the road.
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Fig. 4: Minaret Summit Road, 2007. This road descends from the Sierran crest  
near the town of Mammoth Lakes to Devils Postpile National Monument.  
Photograph by the author.
the Sierra and Inyo National Forests (those most affected by the proposed road) 
issued a joint statement deploring the “adverse effects” such a road would have 
on the forest, and that such effects would outweigh benefits for “national forest 
uses.” That is, the Forest Service came down on the side of wilderness, rejecting 
the necessity of the road for access. The statement continued that the Minaret 
Summit road would only be justified if “required for interstate and 
intercommunity public travel and commerce, or to meet national defense 
objectives.”123
123 Karl M. Kidder, “Minarets Highway—New Opposition,” Fresno Bee, December 19, 1971, p. A4.
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Under Livermore's counsel, Reagan publicly declared the State against 
improvement of the eastern portion of the Minaret Summit road and against any 
trans-Sierra road, saying it would “desecrate one of the great wilderness areas of 
our state.”124 Ever the showman, Reagan led a horseback trip into the Sierra 
Nevada on June 28, 1972. In a mountain press conference,125 Reagan announced 
that he had gained President Nixon's support for halting improvement of the 
road.126 Echoing Livermore's concerns, Reagan said the road would be a “foot in 
the door” for a trans-Sierra highway. He told the press he would seek to close the 
wilderness gap, “to preserve the vast, primitive beauty of this wilderness for 
generations of Californians yet to come.”127 The road's proponents vowed to press 
on, but without federal or state support, they failed to turn the tide.
124 Wilson K. Lythgoe, “Reagan Lables Minaret Road Plan 'Desecration,” Fresno Bee, June 15, 
1972, p. D3.
125 The Sierra Club had first planned a press conference in the same area to chastise the federal 
Department of Transportation for deciding to reconstruct the part of the road leading to Devils 
Postpile National Monument, and the Department of Transportation's “refusal to state that the 
Trans-Sierra Highway would not be built.” Through opposition to the road, Governor Reagan and 
the White House co-opted the press conference as a “celebration” for their “forthright stand.” 
(Memorandum for John Ehrlichman from Caspar W. Weinberger, June 21, 1972, folder “[Ex] HI 
2/ST 1/1/71-,” White House Central Files, Subject Files, HI (Highways-Bridges), Nixon 
Presidential Materials.
126 Wilson K. Lythgoe, “US Drops Plans To Build Minarets Summit Highway,” Fresno Bee, June 
29, 1972, p. A1. The job was to have been put out for bid on June 30. Whatever his motivations, 
Nixon left a substantial environmental legacy, including creation of the Environmental Protection 
Agency, implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act, and a number of pollution 
control measures. Admiring biographer Jonathan Aitken characterizes Nixon as “a late and at 
times reluctant convert to the causes of the conservation movement”; environmental historians 
Samuel Hays and Robert Gottlieb similarly point to Nixon's possible insincerity—but also to his 
environmental successes. See Jonathan Aitken, Nixon: A Life (Washington, D.C.: Regenery, 
2003), 395-399; Hays, 58; Robert Gottlieb, 153.
127 Lythgoe, “US Drops Plans.”
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The combined efforts of Governor Reagan and President Nixon stopped 
the Minaret Summit road in 1972; the California Wilderness Act of 1984 closed 
this road gap by expanding the Minarets Wilderness (and renaming it after 
recently deceased conservationist Ansel Adams). The act ruled out the possibility 
of a future road by closing the gap left open fifty years prior. In an interesting 
turn of events, Reagan's presidential administration opposed the wilderness 
legislation, because it contained far more wilderness designation for California 
than the administration wanted.128
The Minaret Summit struggle showed the vitality of the wilderness 
concept. In the 1930s, the Forest Service specifically designated the corridor as 
non-wilderness, to allow for eventual construction of a road. The Sierra Club 
agreed, and endorsed the road. And yet, today the road is unbuilt, and the 
corridor has legislative protection as a wilderness. The sequence of events plainly 
demonstrates that humans construct wilderness just as they do roads. The 
corridor has changed little in the fifty years between non-designation and 
designation. If anything, the area would have been less wild in 1984, from a closer 
logging and recreation road in the west to greater numbers of recreation-seekers 
attracted to the Mammoth Mountain area in the east. In other words, the corridor 
never had to exist in the first place, and the 1984 re-designation affirmed, both 
symbolically and legally, that a road would not cross the Sierra Nevada in this 
128 Eleanor Randolph, “Burton Death May Affect Legislation,” Los Angeles Times, April 12, 1983, 
p. B3. The 2.3 million acres of wilderness proposed in the original bill shrank to 1.8 million in the 
version made into law.
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area. The eventual legislative solution is strikingly similar to the one that finally 
halted plans for developing Mineral King as a ski resort.
Mineral King
Mineral King shared many similarities with the Minaret Summit road 
situation. The Sierra Club, as a major conservation organization, came out in 
opposition to a major project after earlier formal approvals. The Club again 
clashed with the Forest Service (home to the mandate of “multiple use”), though 
much more strongly at Mineral King because of the more activist developer role 
assumed by the Forest Service. The development struggle engaged the attention 
of government at a variety of levels and interested citizens. Just as the State of 
California, the Park and Forest Service, the Sierra Club, local government and 
boosters met and battled over the Minaret Summit road, so too did they work 
with and face off against one another in the planned transformation of the 
Mineral King Valley. Conservationists again turned to the Park Service in hopes 
of blocking the project. But in an odd turn of events, the Sierra Club successfully 
used a road to halt a development. After the wilderness consciousness raising of 
the 1930s, conservation organizations looked carefully at new roads because of 
how they encouraged development and allowed for significantly increased access. 
By impeding improvement of the Mineral King access road, the Sierra Club 
delayed the project enough to engineer a legislative solution, with transfer of the 
valley to Park Service control. 
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The First Road to Mineral King
The Mineral King valley and surrounding mountainsides experienced a 
mining boom in the 1870s that brought the first development of any sort to 
Mineral King, but miners found it less than a dream come true. The inability to 
easily (and cheaply) process the ore on-site contributed to financial problems for 
the mines. All attempts to construct a wagon road to the valley proved difficult, 
and the road's character added to the expense of continuing mining operations. 
As Linda A. Wallace, a former Mineral King ranger and historian of the Mineral 
King Road, writes, “The road was built for one reason – to exploit the perceived 
riches in a small subalpine valley. Little thought was given to the distant future in 
those heady days of construction.”129 The miners anxious to stake their claims 
constructed the road at the lowest quality possible—a circumstance that made 
later improvements exceedingly difficult.
The Mineral King Road originated in 1874 as a pack trail to haul mining 
equipment up the East Fork of the Kaweah River. Though miners used this early 
path (the Meadows Trail) to haul a considerable amount of material to the mines, 
it never became more than a trail.130 The New England Tunnel and Smelting 
Company tried to improve the trail in 1877 when it gained new ownership of the 
mine, but ceased work when continued financial difficulties took their toll. When 
Thomas Fowler revived mining interest in Mineral King, he made transformation 
129 Linda A. Wallace, A Short History of the Mineral King Road, Sequoia National Park,  
California (Linda A. Wallace, 2004), 1.
130 Ibid., 12.
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of the trail into a wagon road a top priority, helping to form the Mineral King 
Wagon and Toll Road Company.131 When completed in August 1879, the wagon 
road construction had taken more than five years, with a final five-month burst of 
effort allowing wagons to enter the Mineral King valley for the first time.132 In 
1899, Second Lieutenant Henry B. Clark, acting superintendent of the two parks, 
reported on the road's poor quality:
This so-called county road through a National Park is unsatisfactory, and 
presents many complications and opportunities for disputes with trespassers 
and stockmen. The county of Tulare spends but very little for its repair, while 
the General Government contributes nothing, though both are alike 
interested in the improvement of this single thoroughfare. The roadway is cut 
in the hillside, and the grade as now established is wretched.133
By 1965 (and still today), the road had benefited from only small 
improvements from the wagon road days. It follows much the same route, with 
the exception of a rough grade that was replaced on a lower portion of the road. 
The road was widened for automobiles and has retaining walls to keep the 
roadbed in place.134 But miners and laborers built the road to serve wagons, and 
nobody had since re-engineered it to support high-speed automobile travel—a 
point of perennial grief for proponents of downhill skiing in Mineral King.135
Interest in developing Mineral King for winter sports predated (by many 
years) the Forest Service's February 1965 prospectus. The Forest Service reacted 
131 Ibid., 26.
132 Dilsaver and Tweed, 46-47; Wallace, 30.
133 Dilsaver and Tweed, 86.
134 Wallace, 32.
135 From personal experience in 2005, the author pegs the maximum safe speed for the road at 
about 20 mph—if there is no oncoming traffic.
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Fig. 5: Mineral King Road, 2005. The road is unstriped for virtually its entire 
length, but is mostly paved. Photograph by the author.
both to the trend toward increased recreation generally and to specific interest in 
Mineral King.136 As early as World War II, interested parties inquired with the 
Forest Service about possibly developing the area for skiing. In 1945 and again in 
1946, the Forest Service sent in personnel to make very preliminary surveys of 
the suitability of Mineral King for winter sports. Their conclusions presaged the 
136 In Colorado, the Forest Service took an early role supporting alpine skiing and cooperated with 
local organizations in promoting skiing. This cooperation was vital to recreational skiing's 
development, because in 1946 “Colorado skiers did at least 90 percent of their skiing on federal 
land...with every one of the state's developed winter sports sites either on or adjoining national 
forest or park land.” (Coleman, 90, 138-146.) In California, much of the best ski terrain was 
similarly under Forest Service administration.
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later arguments over Mineral King: the area had enormous potential because of 
the number and variety of slopes, but it was one of the last (natural) areas of its 
kind and the present road could not handle wintertime traffic.137
In 1953, the National Park Service, recognizing the interest in developing 
Mineral King as a winter sports area, began probing its potential responsibilities 
for a concomitant road improvement project. In February of that year, Sequoia 
and Kings Canyon Superintendent E. T. Scoyen informed Regional Director 
Lawrence C. Merriam about “local agitation again” over developing Mineral King. 
Scoyen spoke with the Secretary of the Tulare County Chamber of Commerce and 
informed him that the Park Service would not build the road, because “there was 
no sound National Park reason” why it should. Scoyen confided in Merriam that 
the financing prospects for the project were so remote as to be virtually non-
existent, and Scoyen's job, as he saw it, was “to be sure that it is not loaded on the 
National Park Service.”138 In April, Scoyen further informed Merriam of private 
efforts to construct a toll road, backed by at least $4 million of private money. 
Informing the Park Service Director of these developments, Merriam remarked 
that “acquiescence in a toll road through the park might prove a dangerous 
precedent and that in general we would oppose the road as such,” and he further 
suggested that an Act of Congress might be required to legally construct a toll 
137 Arthur B. Ferguson, Jr. and William P. Bryson, “Comment, Mineral King: A Case Study in 
Forest Decision Making,” Ecology Law Quarterly 2 (1972): 500. The road problem presented 
itself each time the prospect of Mineral King development was raised in the 1940s and 1950s.
138 Memorandum to Regional Director, Region Four from Superintendent, Sequoia and Kings 
Canyon, February 16, 1953; L3027 SEQU; Administrative Files, 1949-1971; Records of the 
National Park Service, Record Group 79; National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. 
Hereafter all citations to RG 79 will be to this Administrative Files series.
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road.139
In a May 27, 1953, report to Chief Landscape Architect Thomas Vint, 
Benjamin L. Breeze laid out the problems inherent in a toll road across national 
park land, chief among them the lack of precedent. While stating that the Park 
Service itself had no vested interest in having the road improved, Breeze noted it 
had previously shown a willingness to work with the Forest Service: “In 1950, 
when Tulare County suggested a survey from Route 198 to Mineral King, we 
replied ‘In the event the United States Forest Service initiates such a 
reconnaissance survey, the National Park Service will be glad to collaborate.' No 
action was taken by the Forest Service, to my knowledge.”140 Although a toll road 
emerged as a possibility later on, the salient point here concerns the Park 
Service's ambivalent attitude toward a road when development would have been 
much smaller than plans proposed later. Park Service administrators expressed a 
willingness to work with the Forest Service, but they sought to avoid 
entanglement in the development as much as possible, because the road and ski 
facility had nothing to do with national park values. At the same time, they 
recognized that the current road probably occupied “the only practicable route.”141 
139 Memorandum to National Park Service Director from Regional Director, Region Four, April 21, 
1953; L3027 SEQU; RG 79. During the main fight over improvement of the Mineral King Road in 
the 1960s, the Sierra Club and Park Service talked of any roads within national parks needing to 
service a “park purpose” or violate the Service's Organic Act. Scoyen and Merriam were unsure if 
granting a toll road franchise to a private party would lawfully fall within the Park Service's 
mission.
140 Letter from Thomas Vint to Benjamin L. Breeze, May 27, 1953; L3027 SEQU; RG 79.
141 Memorandum to National Park Service Director from Regional Director, Region Four, April 21, 
1953; L3027 SEQU; RG 79.
67
Because this 1953 development never came to pass, nobody tested the Park 
Service's willingness to allow road improvement. The Forest Service, however, 
filed away the Park Service's expressed desire to gladly cooperate on the project.
One final note on postwar skiing in California's national forests is in order 
here. Along with roads, the rise of recreational skiing contributed to the Sierra 
Club embracing a wilderness ethic. This is most evident in 1940s attempts to 
develop the San Gorgonio Wild Area, in the highest mountains east of Los 
Angeles, for skiing. Skiers coveted the area because of its terrain and closeness to 
the Southern California population centers. The Forest Service established the 
San Gorgonio Primitive Area in 1931, before recreational skiing had come to 
California. Pressure from groups such as the California Chamber of Commerce 
and the California Ski Association caused the Forest Service, in the mid-1940s, to 
consider removing land from the heart of the wilderness for development as a ski 
center.142 Anthony Godfrey writes that what started as a local issue “blossomed 
into a broad, national debate on Forest Service wilderness policy,” as the ski 
groups, environmental organizations (including The Wilderness Society), and 
others argued about the proper use of the land. Reacting to letters protesting the 
potential ski development, Forest Service Chief Lyle Watts in 1947 conceded the 
area had “higher public value as a wilderness and a watershed than as a downhill 
skiing area.”143
142 Godfrey, 366.
143 Ibid., 368. A year earlier, Watts had said that “the public value of the ski area seems to be so 
much greater than the value of the area as a wilderness that modification of the area seems to be a 
public necessity.” (Godfrey, 366.)
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Recognizing the demand for skiing, but wanting to ensure that the 
protected wilderness remained free of ski development, the Sierra Club's Winter 
Sports Committee sought out suitable alternative sites, outside wilderness areas 
and national parks. Concentrating on the Sierra Nevada, the committee's survey 
in 1948 reinforced the conclusions of others that Mineral King offered 
spectacular ski terrain and great opportunity for commercial development, but 
tempered its enthusiasm with concern over road access and avalanche danger in 
the basin. As a result of these surveys and developer interest, the Forest Service 
in 1949 issued a prospectus calling for bids that nevertheless drew only one 
response from a bidder unable to meet all the requirements.144 In 1953 the Tulare 
County Chamber of Commerce again raised the idea, leading to the internal Park 
Service discussions above and a pro-development public hearing, but “once 
again, the inability to provide for all-weather access put a damper on the 
project.”145 Pressure on San Gorgonio waned, too, but when the 1964 Wilderness 
Act afforded the area firmer protection, commercial ski interests again turned 
their attention to Mineral King.
The Wilderness Act was a monumental piece of legislation for the 
environmental movement, as it finally provided legal, rather than administrative, 
protection to wilderness. In the wake of success against Echo Park Dam, Howard 
Zahniser of The Wilderness Society drafted and began working toward such 
144 John L. Harper, Mineral King: Public Concern With Government Policy (Arcata, Calif.: 
Pacifica Publishing Co., 1982), 53-55.
145 Godfrey, 421-422; Harper, 53-56.
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legislation, marking what Roderick Frazier Nash calls “a determination [for 
preservationists] to take the offensive.”146 To those concerned the the Wilderness 
Act would “lock up” lands, wilderness advocates pointed out that the bill applied 
to lands which already had some protection, and would at most only encompass 
about two percent of the country's land area.147 The Act's definition of wilderness 
embraced the tenets of the philosophy first espoused The Wilderness Society: “an 
area...untrammeled by man, where man himself is a visitor who does not 
remain.”148 The Act further stipulated that no commercial enterprise and no 
permanent road be allowed in the wilderness areas covered by the legislation. 
The Wilderness Act was not evoked explicitly in the environmental battles 
involving the Minaret Summit Highway and the Mineral King development 
because they both existed outside of designated wilderness areas. But the Act's 
very passage in the years immediately preceding these battles, particularly in the 
way the Act's wilderness definition excluded roads, underscores how wilderness 
had become a mainstream concern. In trying to keep Mineral King free of a 
expansive destination ski resort, the Sierra Club tapped into this political 
atmosphere that embraced preservation to slow and eventually halt development 
efforts.
146 Nash, Wilderness , 222.
147 Ibid., 223.
148 The text of the Act is in Lary M. Dilsaver, America's National Park System: The Critical  
Documents, Lanham Way, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1994, 277-286.
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The Sierra Club at Mineral King
As an interest group first concerned with the mountains of the “Pacific 
coast” and later beyond, the Sierra Club provided input and commented on 
management and development plans for the Sierra Nevada from an early time. 
The Club recognized that day-to-day agency administration much more than 
sporadic legislation shaped the wild lands. The Forest Service had for many years 
used the Club as a “friendly lobby” to help with Congressional appropriations and 
public relations of Forest Service activity. But as the Forest Service moved from 
custodial management to a greater emphasis on use (particularly with timber), 
and as the Club found itself increasingly questioning Forest Service motives, this 
cooperative spirit dissipated.149 Likewise with the National Park Service: the 
Sierra Club had advance knowledge of and input to plans made by the Service. 
Though the two organizations did not march completely in lock step, they shared 
many common goals. Conrad Wirth, Director of the National Park Service, 
expressed such a thought in a 1958 letter to former Sierra Club President Harold 
E. Crowe, commenting that “even a casual survey indicates that our field of 
agreement is much broader than the sum of our differences.”150
But the Club and the Park Service did disagree on specific issues, as did the 
Club and the Forest Service. While the Sierra Club went on record in the 1940s 
approving Mineral King development, the 1960s plans ran counter to the Sierra 
149 Susan R. Schrepfer, “Establishing Administrative ‘Standing': The Sierra Club and the Forest 
Service, 1897-1956,” The Pacific Historical Review 58 (1989): 57-58.
150 Letter from Conrad Wirth to Harold E. Crowe, January 7, 1958; A22 Sierra Club Pt. 3 WASO 
from 1-1-1958; RG 79.
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Club's ideals and what it saw as the public demands of the time. The Forest 
Service excluded the Sierra Club from planning for the 1960s development, 
sloughing off the Club by stating that public demand justified the development 
and the Sierra Club could consult with the winning bidder.151 This treatment by 
the Forest Service combined with other conflicts (such as that over San Gorgonio) 
to convince the Sierra Club that administrative politics alone were ineffective, for 
the Club had no assurance the Forest Service would consider all outside 
suggestions.
In 1947 and again in 1949, the Sierra Club board of directors formally 
endorsed development of Mineral King. Martin Litton, one of the least 
development-minded of the directors, recalled, “Any place that could be 
developed for skiing, the Sierra Club used to kind of think that was nice.”152 Alex 
Hildebrand, a Sierra Club director from 1948-1957 and 1963-1966, framed the 
selection in the context of possible threats to other areas (such as to San 
Gorgonio). In the 1940s—in light of the rapid expansion in skiing and the 
inability of current facilities to meet demand—the Club argued it could “serve a 
useful purpose by helping to locate areas that would be suitable for ski resorts 
and promote their use.” In other words, the Club sought to influence Forest 
Service decisions by providing information framed as the Club itself wished. The 
Club undertook its own snow surveys and, although the terrain and access did 
151 Ferguson and Bryson, 507.
152 Martin Litton, “Sierra Club Director and Uncompromising Preservationist, 1950s-1970s,” an 
oral history conducted 1980-1981 by Ann Lage, in Sierra Club Leaders I, 1950s-1970s, Sierra Club 
Oral History Series, Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California, 
Berkeley, 1982, 74.
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hold some drawbacks, selected Mineral King because of the availability of snow 
and the fact that it lay outside any national park.153 The Sierra Club later claimed 
that it supported only fairly modest skiing facilities at Mineral King—certainly 
nothing on the scale of the $3-million development called for by the Forest 
Service in 1965, much less the $35-million proposal with which Walt Disney 
Productions responded later that year.154 Beyond the enlarged scope of the 
development, other circumstances had changed, too. By the 1960s, the Club had 
grown in size, placed stronger emphasis on the rights of nature, and distrusted 
federal agencies that it saw as actively destroying the environment.155 This 
adversarial relationship caused the Sierra Club to look elsewhere (to the judiciary 
and legislature) and came from a litany of conservation battles, including several 
in the Sierra Nevada.
Since approval of initial plans for Mineral King development, broader 
changes in the country and the population led the Sierra Club to increased 
activism in the growing environmental movement. From opposition to logging in 
the Deadman Creek area of the Sierra Nevada, to the Mission 66 development 
program in the national parks, to dams in Dinosaur National Monument and the 
Grand Canyon, the Club increased its national profile. In response to the 
153 Alexander Hildebrand, “Sierra Club Leader and Critic: Perspective on Club Growth, Scope, and 
Tactics, 1950s-1970s,” an oral history conducted in 1981 by Ann Lage, in Sierra Club Leaders I,  
1950s-1970s, Sierra Club Oral History Series, Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, 
University of California, Berkeley, 1982, 35.
154 McCloskey, 174.
155 Susan R. Schrepfer, “Perspectives on Conservation: Sierra Club Strategies in Mineral King,” 
Journal of Forest History 20 (1976): 190.
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increased pace and scale of public works such as dams, and to the booming 
population and subsequent growth in outdoor recreation, the Sierra Club's 
advocacy efforts increased dramatically. Projects that the Club previously might 
have approved or accepted were now approached with caution because of the 
shrinking numbers of wild areas. Although the Sierra Club never had been just a 
hiking club, it had become a more strident conservationist and pro-wilderness 
voice.156 Beginning in the 1950s, the Club became less cooperative and more 
adversarial in dealings with the Forest Service and the Park Service. William Siri, 
who's active involvement with the Club began in 1956, recalls it as beginning to 
take a purist posture on wilderness issues at this time: “There are no trade-offs; 
there are no compromises; except those into which you're backed, by sheer 
force.”157 Siri saw the very function of the Club as that of an adversarial 
organization.158 As detailed below, the Club expressed this contrary position to 
the agencies by engaging in administrative politics with the Forest Service and 
Park Service over key disputes that dampened the cooperative spirit.
When the Forest Service planned to log Deadman Creek in the eastern 
Sierra in the 1950s, David Brower had the Sierra Club bring in its own outside 
experts, whose findings contradicted the needs expressed by Forest Service 
officials. Harold K. Steen, author of a history of the Forest Service, notes that this 
156 Brower, 181; Godfrey, 425.
157 William E. Siri, Reflections on the Sierra Club, the Environment, and Mountaineering, 1950s-
1970s, an oral history conducted by Ann Lage, Sierra Club History Series, Regional Oral History 
Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1979, 86.
158 Ibid., 89.
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event “ended any question in Brower's mind that the Forest Service no longer 
could be trusted.”159 Though the Sierra Club historically aligned itself closely with 
the Park Service, the two organizations disagreed sharply on the Mission 66 
program. As discussed above, the Park Service reconstructed Yosemite's Tioga 
Road over Club dissent. By the time the Club met to reconsider the Mineral King 
development, then, the directors (led by David Brower) felt they had ample 
reason to be suspicious of the programs of the federal land managers.
The 1965 reversal of the 1947 endorsement of Mineral King development 
came about only after significant disagreement among the Sierra Club board of 
directors. Several members on the board had participated in the earlier decision 
and felt the Club honor-bound to live up to its earlier commitment. Bestor 
Robinson, a Sierra Club Director from 1935 into the 1960s whom David Brower 
felt too often sided with the developers, thought it in the Club's best interests to 
live up to its earlier agreements. Because the Sierra Club frequently responded to 
plans of these agencies, reneging on promises did not help relations.160 Alex 
Hildebrand, who participated in the 1947 pledge, felt the proposed development 
was not damaging enough to require a reversal of the board's earlier decision.161 
The Forest Service, because it had this earlier pledge in hand, did not foresee 
159 Steen, 303.
160 Bestor Robinson, “Thoughts on Conservation and the Sierra Club,” an oral history conducted in 
1974 by Susan R. Schrepfer, in Sierra Club Reminiscences I, 1900s-1960s, Sierra Club History 
Series, Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 
1974, 46-47. In the introduction to the oral history, Schrepfer says Robinson “is not a purist,” but 
“favors the realistic approach to scenic preservation” (v).
161 Hildebrand, 37.
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serious opposition to the development and therefore felt secure in issuing the 
development prospectus.162 The perspectives of both the Club and the Forest 
Service here indicate the importance the environmental organization attached to 
administrative politics.
But several directors realized that things had changed since the earlier 
acquiescence.163 After the Forest Service issued the prospectus in February 1965, 
the directors discussed the size of the proposed development. These early 
meetings focused on mitigation and on the bounds of acceptable development.164 
The Executive Committee, at an emergency meeting held March 5, in fact ordered 
Kern-Kaweah Chapter chairman John Harper to cooperate with the Forest 
Service, an action Harper felt to be “[selling] out the Club's best interests.”165 The 
May 1965 meeting—at which the directors passed a resolution opposing this 
development—revealed an initially divided board. After David Brower spoke up 
in favor of compromising with development, Martin Litton stood up and 
addressed the problems this development would cause. As Litton recalled:
I remember Ansel Adams saying, “I didn't know it was going to be in the 
national park.” (The road, that is.) I said, “All you have to do is look at the 
map, dumbhead.” I showed them a map, and here we were going to ruin 
Sequoia National Park for this silly thing that the Sierra Club advocated. Why, 




165 Harper, 80. The Kern-Kaweah Chapter consisted of members in Kern and Tulare counties; 
Mineral King is in Tulare County.
166 Litton, 28; Brower, 177.
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Development opponents on the board argued that the Sierra Club had 
sufficient reason to change its position: there had been no hearing on changing 
the land classification of Mineral King (whose status had been “quiescent” for 
many years); the Sierra Club's policy on wilderness and buffer zones had changed 
through the years; and while Mineral King was not as a whole wilderness, parts of 
it were a de facto wilderness and the valley served as a jumping off place for trips 
into the surrounding wilderness. Litton brought up the possible effects on 
Sequoia National Park, but the minutes from that May meeting indicate that the 
Sierra Club also feared that a high-speed road to Mineral King would foster a 
connecting link over Farewell Gap (at the southern end of the valley) with the 
proposed Olancha-Porterville Road.167 The resolution that resulted from these 
debates opposed development as provided for in the prospectus, requested that 
public hearings be held, and informed the Forest Service of Sierra Club support 
for the primitive nature of Mineral King.168
William Siri, the Sierra Club President at this time, recalled in the 1970s 
that sufficient time had passed and the circumstances had changed enough for 
there to be “no grounds” for the Sierra Club to agree with Mineral King 
development. “It simply had to be made ultimately a part of Sequoia National 
Park, and this of course has been the intent of the club ever since then. I don't 





Though the Sierra Club engaged in litigation to slow the proposed development 
and still engaged in dialogue with the Forest Service over the development's 
parameters, the Club ultimately sought transfer of the valley to the relative safety 
of Park Service control, which could only be effected through an Act of Congress.
The Rivalry Played Out: Interagency Politics and the Sierra Club Block 
Improved Access
On February 27, 1965, the Forest Service issued the prospectus “for a 
proposed Recreational Development at Mineral King in the Sequoia National 
Forest.” After only a couple of sentences stating the purpose of the prospectus 
and giving a very general description of Mineral King's location, the prospectus's 
introduction devotes two paragraphs to the problem of visitor access:
The high potential of Mineral King for a winter sports development has been 
recognized for more than two decades, but the lack of suitable winter access 
has prevented development of the area. During the past 25 years there has 
been little change in the access road situation at Mineral King, but during this 
same time, public demand for winter sports development has increased 
greatly – especially in Southern California
Improving the access for winter travel is an essential first step in the 
development of this area. The Forest Service does not suggest how, when, or 
by whom this will be done. This prospectus is issued with the understanding 
that the successful applicant will find sufficient incentive, without obligation 
on the part of the Forest Service, to solve the winter access problem so that a 
major year-round recreation development may result.170
170 “Prospectus For a proposed Recreational Development at Mineral King in the Sequoia National 
Forest,” February, 1965, p. 1; U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, California Region; 
Mineral King Collection, Special Collections Library, Henry Madden Library, California State 
University, Fresno (hereafter Mineral King Collection).
78
To nobody's surprise, Walt Disney Productions responded to the 
prospectus.171 Walt Disney himself had been one of the first investors in one of the 
first ski resorts in the Sierra, the Sugar Bowl Ski Resort on Donner Pass, and he 
had served as master of pageantry at the 1960 Winter Olympics in Squaw Valley, 
both in the Lake Tahoe area. What's more, Disney did not just happen to respond 
to the development proposal, but had been in active talks with the Forest Service 
about some sort of recreational ski development in Southern California.172 The 
success of Disneyland (opened in 1955) contributed to Walt's interest in 
expanding the company's presence in outdoor entertainment, and the first land 
had already been purchased for Walt Disney World as the company also worked 
on Mineral King designs.
The Disney plans for Mineral King downsized over the years as on-site 
investigators evaluated the avalanche hazard and as growing public concern 
caused it to scale back its objectives. The plans submitted in 1965 called for 
fourteen ski lifts to seven locations above the Mineral King valley that would also 
separate advanced, intermediate and beginning skiers.173 But the additional 
171 Disney was not the only group to respond to this proposal. Five others also presented plans on 
August 31, 1965. The high profile nature of the project caused the Secretary of Agriculture Orville 
Freeman to make the final decision on the winning bidder. (Harper, 87, 94-95.)
172 For Walt's involvement with the Sugar Bowl, see Jeff Pepper, “Mount Disney: The Legacy of 
Walt at Sugar Bowl,” http://www.2719hyperion.com/2008/03/mount-disney-legacy-of-walt-at-
sugar.html (accessed November 1, 2008). Both a Sierra Club member (Harper, 61-67) and a 
member of Disney's planning staff (Harrison “Buzz” Price, in his Walt's Revolution! By the 
Numbers (Orlando, Fla.: Ripley Entertainment, 2003), pp. 46-51) note the Disney interest in 
Mineral King well before the 1965 prospectus. Price additionally notes that Disney considered San 
Gorgonio, but was warned off by the Forest Service because of a “hornets nest of opposition” (46).
173 Walt Disney Productions, “Walt Disney Submits Application for Mineral King Recreational 
Development,” press release, August 31, 1965, Mineral King Collection.
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Fig. 6: Proposed Mineral King Ski Resort, 1965-1978. Reproduced from Dilsaver 
and Tweed.
facilities on the valley floor put the “major” in “major year-round recreation 
development,” and serves as an example of the post-war commodified ski 
experiences Annie Coleman describes in Colorado.174 The north end of the valley 
would have a self-contained alpine village, with two large hotels, ice skating rink, 
convenience shops, conference center, cafeterias, restaurants, and other support 
facilities, such as a first aid station and fire station. And although the Disney 
plans were founded on improvement of the road to the valley, the 2,500-vehicle 
174 Coleman, 4. Indeed, the singing Audio-Animatronics bears Disney planned for the village have 
little to do with skiing. The bears found their way to Disney theme parks in the Country Bear 
Jamboree show.
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parking area was situated outside the valley, in what the 1965 press release called 
“one of the most significant aspects” of the plans.175
 But Disney could not act alone to construct the resort. The Mineral King 
valley itself, including the mountainsides up to the ridgeline, was under complete 
control of the Forest Service. However, the Park Service managed lands that 
surrounded Mineral King on the north, east, and west. Although the Forest 
Service and Bureau of Land Management controlled much of the land to the west, 
the Mineral King Road inescapably traversed miles through national park lands, 
and its improvement required consent of the Park Service. Tulare County had 
maintained the road—including the length in Sequoia National Park—until 
California adopted it as a state highway in 1965. These circumstances dictated 
that only cooperative efforts could secure the road's improvement to an all-
weather standard.
The Forest Service's attempt to place the onus of road improvement on the 
developer is interesting, for the Service and its parent, the Department of 
Agriculture, devoted significant resources to working with the National Park 
Service to secure approval for the improvements. The Forest Service estimated 
the cost of constructing a road suitable for winter access at more than $5 million, 
and again reminded the developer, “no public agency is obligated to undertake 
the road project.”176 The winning bidder would be issued a preliminary permit of 
three years. The thirty-year term permit would be contingent on the first contract 
175 Walt Disney Productions, “Walt Disney Submits Application.”
176 “Prospectus,” p. 3.
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being let for a “significant portion” of the improved road and when funds were 
programmed for completion of the road within five years, in addition to required 
approval from the Forest Service of development plans.177 The Forest Service 
clearly recognized the problem of access from the previous development efforts. 
But thrusting the responsibility onto a private company, who campaigned to 
make it again a public responsibility, did little to help the situation.
Well before the Forest Service accepted a bid—indeed, over a month before 
the bid deadline—the California Legislature incorporated the Mineral King road 
into the state highway system. John Harper, who wrote his perspective on the 
Mineral King development to address examples of “surreptitious planning…that 
did not seem to serve the public's interest,” provides the State's action in this 
regard as one such instance. As Harper points out, the State agreed to finance an 
improved road without knowing the cost, without having done a feasibility study, 
and without even knowing what form the development would take!178 The State, 
eager to secure external financing for the road's improvement, in September 1966 
applied for a $3 million grant (for a road estimated to cost around $25 million) 
from the federal Economic Development Agency, under the argument that the 
road and Mineral King development would benefit economically depressed 
Tulare County. The EDA approved the grant in the following month, but it came 
with certain stipulations: the State had to put up matching funds and meet 
certain deadlines for the grant money to be paid. From December 14, 1966, 
177 Ibid., p. 5.
178 Harper, 111.
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California had 24 months to get the entire road project under contract. This 
proved difficult for two reasons: first, as detailed below, the National Park Service 
only reluctantly approved an improved road after much delay; second, the road 
had no clear funding source. As set forth in a special report released by the 
Division of Highways on February 8, 1967, the $20 million required for the road 
represented about 10 percent of the unfrozen funds for Southern California and 
“the allocation of funds to such a project must be at the expense of other critical 
projects which were considered as deficiencies.” The report suggested that 
cooperative financing, possibly involving Walt Disney Productions, the Forest 
Service, and Tulare County, as a possible solution.179 Because the State had 
assumed the road without any studies, it had put itself on the hook for an 
unknown amount of money with little idea of the end result. Although Governor 
Edmund Brown had heavily endorsed the project, going so far as to appear at a 
press conference at Mineral King with Walt Disney in October 1966, his 1967 
replacement, Ronald Reagan, had serious misgivings about using taxpayer money 
to help the development. Reagan's philosophy of fiscal discipline later led to 
formal removal of the road from the state highway system.
Although the outcome was the same—Reagan opposed improving a road in 
the Sierra Nevada—his reasons for removing the Mineral King road from the 
state highway system stood in rather stark contrast to the reasons he came out 
against the Minarets road. At the time Reagan signed the bill in August 1972, 
coming just two months after the Minarets press conference, Reagan remarked 
179 Ibid., 118.
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that he was “firmly in support of the development of Mineral King as a recreation 
area,” but felt that “proper future development” did not require a high-speed road 
and that “alternate access methods” could meet the need better than a road.180 In 
a 1978 syndicated radio address (part of a series delivered by Reagan between 
1975 and 1979), Reagan stressed the need for recreation on public lands. He 
pointed to the amount of wilderness or roadless areas around Mineral King as 
justification for its development.181 Reagan's decisions, then, did not solely come 
from an abiding defense of the wilderness, but were also influenced by his 
feelings toward recreation and government spending.
As the Department of Agriculture neared selection of a winning bid for 
Mineral King development, the Park Service informed the Forest Service to make 
prospective bidders aware of the Park Service's insistence that any improvement 
to the road “not seriously scar the landscape.”182 The Park Service had specific 
guidelines for national park roads and also had serious questions regarding their 
legal responsibilities and obligations concerning the road.183 The 1950s 
180 “Reagan Signs Mineral King Highway Ban,” Fresno Bee, August 19, 1972:, p. A1.
181 Skinner, Kiron K., Annelise Anderson, and Martin Anderson, eds, Reagan's Path to Victory: 
The Shaping of Ronald Reagan's Vision: Selected Writings (Old Tappan, NJ: Free Press, 2004), 
278-279.
182 Letter from Assistant Director Howard R. Stagner to Mr. and Mrs. Walter Weyman, December 
22, 1965; L3027 SEQU Mineral King Ski Area 1-1-1964 to 12-31-1965 Pt. 1; RG 79. While this is 
the underlying philosophy of the parkways embraced by the Park Service in the 1920s, the Park 
Service had no such goals for this road, as it merely cut across park lands. Additionally, the 
carefully manicured landscapes characteristic of parkways would have been difficult to achieve 
with the Mineral King Road because of the presence of numerous giant sequoias.
183 Dating back to 1926, when the National Park Service signed a Memorandum of Agreement with 
the Bureau of Public Roads regarding road construction in national parks, the Service had explicit 
standards for roads under its stead. See Ethan Carr, Landscape by Design: Landscape 
Architecture  and the National Park Service (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 
1998), 174-175.
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development proposal that considered a toll road had vexed Park Service 
management. Since the road did little to benefit Sequoia National Park—it ran 
through park lands but did not provide access to any recreational developments 
within the park—and could in fact bring environmental harm to the park, would 
the Park Service be violating its mandate? Could the Park Service legally allow the 
road improvement, given its non-park purpose? The Sierra Club strongly lobbied 
the Park Service to embrace a preservationist attitude, using arguments about 
harmful environmental effects and a strict interpretation of Park Service road 
policies.184 As evidenced by the three years of negotiations required for the Park 
Service to agree to construction and to grant permits, the Park Service 
experienced internal disagreements about the desirability of road improvements 
and its obligations to the Forest Service.
These contradictions are particularly well expressed by both Interior 
Secretary Stewart Udall (1961-1969) and Park Service Director George B. 
Hartzog, Jr. (1964-1972). They understood the threats facing the national parks 
and the need for parks to play an integral role in the growing recreation 
movement, but did not emphasize wilderness enough for the Sierra Club. Rather 
than focus on intensive development of national park facilities, as his predecessor 
Connie Wirth had done, Hartzog aggressively expanded the system itself at a pace 
more rapid than ever before.185 William Siri recalled that Hartzog understood and 




pressure. He worked with conservation organizations, but compromised for the 
sake of retaining his position.186 In discussions with other Interior Department 
officials, Hartzog expressed his extreme displeasure over the road, but he 
ultimately accepted Udall's acceptance of the road improvements. In 1964, 
mindful of President Lyndon Johnson's mandate for expanded outdoor 
recreation programs, Secretary Udall and the Interior Department issued a 
seventy-six-page pamphlet entitled The Race for Inner Space, describing threats 
to the America's wildlands. In it, Udall announced that he and Agriculture 
Secretary Orville Freeman had agreed to a new era of cooperation to provide 
necessary recreation facilities.187 The Forest Service, however, failed to consult 
with the Park Service (or the Sierra Club or other organizations) before issuing 
the development prospectus, poisoning the atmosphere surrounding the project. 
While the Park Service refrained from outright attacks on the Forest Service in its 
Mineral King efforts, Interior officials privately worried about possible effects on 
Sequoia National Park.
As a public relations matter, the Park Service expressed support for the 
Forest Service to manage its lands as it saw fit and additionally mentioned a 
required “diversity of opportunity” in the outdoors, including in the “orderly 
development of resorts, ski areas, and other pursuits desired by our expanding 
population.” The Park Service attempted to assuage opponents by repeating 




the canyon.188 Internally, however, Interior Department officials worried over the 
scope of the road project planned by the State of California. In response to a 
March 16, 1967 letter from Walt Disney Productions, Stanley Cain (Assistant 
Secretary of the Interior for Fish, Wildlife and Parks) attached a note to Hartzog 
with the comment, “We can't go for [these/this]189 road. It serves no NPS purpose 
– is wholly an intrusion.”190 A week later, Cain expressed similar sentiments to 
Hartzog when a letter came in from the California Transportation Agency asking 
for approval in principle for the “general concept” of constructing the road: “Who 
the hell do they think runs NPS – Disney, USFS, or Calif.? As on the services' 
letter from Disney, I noted we can't give them what they want – shouldn't 
anyway.”191 The Forest Service grew ever more impatient, leading to a series of 
letters between Secretaries Udall and Freeman. Freeman chided Udall for so long 
delaying a necessary project; Udall pointed out the long-term consequences of 
road improvement actions. The communications did little to improve 
departmental relations.192
Udall, though strong-willed and firmly against the Mineral King road 
improvement, nevertheless recognized that he was numerically and politically 
188 Letter from Assistant Director Howard R. Stagner to Mr. and Mrs. Walter Weyman, December 
22, 1965; L3027 SEQU Mineral King Ski Area 1-1-1964 to 12-31-1965 Pt. 1; RG 79. 
189 The State of California and Walt Disney Productions claimed they contemplated building a 
single road, but the Interior Department felt the plans actually called for two roads.
190 Attached to letter from Donn B. Tatum to Secretary Udall, March 16, 1967; L3027 SEQU 
Mineral King Ski Area 1-1-66 to 12-31-1967 Pt. 1-A; RG 79.
191 Attached to letter from Gordon C. Luce to Secretary Udall, March 23, 1967; L3027 SEQU 
Mineral King Ski Area 1-1-66 to 12-31-1967 Pt. 1-A; RG 79.
192 Harper, 133.
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outmatched. A host of opponents allied against him, including Governor 
Reagan,193 the state's U.S. Senators, other U.S. congressmen, state legislators, 
Tulare county officials, businessmen and speculators, and also some members of 
the media.194 In an attempt to mediate this departmental conflict, the Bureau of 
the Budget offered something of a horse trading compromise: in exchange for 
guarantee of Interior Department approval of the Mineral King access road, the 
State of California would finally support establishing Redwood National Park. 
Backed strongly at the federal level by President Johnson and Secretary Udall, 
the redwood park faced equally strong opposition from Governor Reagan. The 
Budget Bureau formally sought this compromise with an October 1967 bill 
sponsored by California Senator Thomas Kuchel. Although the bill did not pass, 
Udall recognized the overwhelming pressure on him to allow the roadwork to 
proceed. At a high level meeting in December 1967, Udall finally relented.195 In a 
press release announcing Interior's cooperation, Agriculture stressed the 
necessity of improved road access and the lack of economic alternatives.196 But 
the generalized agreement to issue permits still required explicit agreements—
negotiations that dragged on for over another year as Interior studied the 
proposed route and formulated its conditions for the permits.
193 Recall that Reagan endorsed the development. He did not demonstrate his opposition to 
government money paying for the road's improvement until 1972, when it became obvious that 
the State would be responsible for the cost.
194 Harper, 133.
195 Ibid., 133-135; Schrepfer, “Perspectives on Conservation,” 186.
196 U.S. Department of Agriculture Press Release, December 27, 1967; L3027 SEQU Mineral King 
Ski Area 1-1-66 to 12-31-1967 Pt. 1-A; RG 79.
88
John Harper writes that the Interior Department simply changed its 
antagonistic tune and began squabbling over “highway design specifications 
rather than right-of-way and routing.” Interior's insistence on studies and 
carefully crafted design requirements seriously delayed the project.197 This delay 
was vital to the Sierra Club's ability to attack the project by other means 
(legislation and litigation). Though Interior had studied the road for over two 
years, and Udall agreed to allow the road project to move forward in December 
1967, by the following March top Interior officials still lacked a clear idea of their 
demands. When Sequoia Superintendent John McLaughlin telephoned 
Washington to inquire about negotiation strategy, Deputy Director Harthon L. 
Bill wrote to Associate Director Howard A. Baker that they would require, in 
short order, ground rules and standards about what is permissible and not. “To 
do otherwise,” Bill wrote, would find them “without a basis for discussions and a 
likelihood of losing any leverage there may be for the protection of resources in 
Sequoia National Park.”198 The Park Service seemed to only have a firm idea that 
no giant sequoia be destroyed or damaged as a result of the road improvement. 
This issue took precedence regardless of cost, as stated in a letter from Karl T. 
Gilbert, the Chief of the Division of Resources and Visitor Protection, to a citizen 
concerned over the road's effects.199 To study the plans of the California Division 
197 Harper, 138.
198 Memorandum from Harthon L. Bill to Associate Director, March 4, 1968; L3027 02 L3027 
SEQU Mineral King Ski Area 1-1-68 to 3-31-68 Pt. 1; RG 79.
199 Letter from Karl T. Gilbert to Mrs. Janet C. Neavles, March 7, 1968; L3027 02 L3027 SEQU 
Mineral King Ski Area 1-1-68 to 3-31-68 Pt. 1; RG 79.
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of Highways (and perhaps give the agency something to fall back on when 
inevitably criticized), the National Park Service contracted with the Clarkeson 
Engineering Company to prepare a report.
John Clarkeson, the lead highway engineer, took issue with the State over 
its insistence on a new alignment and its interactions with the Park Service. He 
strongly endorsed extensive use of the extant right-of-way, something he felt the 
State and Forest Service ignored. But Clarkeson's criticisms extended beyond just 
the design standards, to the actions of the State and Forest Service. In June 1968 
he let the Department know that those agencies would likely give the impression 
that the Park Service was holding things up. Actually, Clarkeson said, the State 
had not even surveyed the route and no heavy work had been done.200 More 
troubling to Clarkeson, the State made statements in oral conferences that 
contradicted the data they submitted, and so all data they submitted should be 
carefully scrutinized. Given the special circumstances of the road through the 
national park, Clarkeson felt the State should provide considerably more 
information on its plans than it had. The State's attitude, Clarkeson wrote, 
“seems to have been that if left alone, a very satisfactory job from the Park's 
viewpoint would be attained. In view of some of the conference discussions and 
in view of nearby examples of similar work by this agency, I do not believe that 
general assurances of this nature should be accepted.”201 Despite Clarkeson's 
200 Memorandum to Chairman, Road Committee from Deputy Assistant Director, Interpretation, 
June 10, 1968; 03 L3027 SEQU Mineral King Ski Area 4-1-68 to Sep. 30 1968 Pt. 2; RG 79.
201 Letter from John Clarkeson to Edward C. Hummel, November 7, 1968; 04 L3027 SEQU 
Mineral King Ski Area 10-1-68 to Feb 28 1969 Pt. 3; RG 79. Clarkeson went on to say that if the 
Division of Highways intended to construct the road as they had California State Highway 198 
(from which the Mineral King Road originated), “it would seem that this agency should not be 
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protestations, the Interior Department in November agreed to the State's 
proposed location of the road, moving the road negotiations into the final stage 
before permits could be issued: design standards.
The design standard negotiations encompassed the precise form of the 
road (in terms of width, grade, overlooks), protective measures necessary during 
construction, and provision for law enforcement on the roadway. Although the 
Park Service rejected Clarkeson's routing recommendation, it endorsed many of 
his suggestions on standards that Clarkeson's report had proposed. The letter 
from Associate Director Hummel to Chief Forester Edward Cliff informing of 
route approval also expressed Interior's displeasure with some of the State's 
proposed standards. Hummel suggested that the Park Service work with the 
Forest Service and Division of Highways to incorporate Clarkeson's suggestions 
on additional bridges, tunnels, viaducts, cribbing, retaining walls and other 
construction methods.202 The Special Use Permit drawn up by the Park Service 
included provisions for such devices and also stipulated that the Park Service 
have final approval over plans before contracts be awarded. Additionally, a Park 
Service representative would work with the State in preparing the plans.203 Like 
trusted with the project in view of the collateral cost to Park values which this type of design and 
construction would entail.”
202 Letter from Edward A. Hummel, Associate Director of the National Park Service, to Edward P. 
Cliff, Chief of the Forest Service, Nov. 14, 1968 (Exhibit V for Plaintiff, Sierra Club v. Hickel, No. 
51464 (N.D. Cal., filed July 23, 1969), rev'd 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. granted, sub nom. 
Sierra Club v. Morton, 91 S. Ct. 870 (1971)).
203 Special Use Permit 4:102-067, attached to memorandum from Associate Director, 
Management and Programming to Regional Director, Western Region, June 3, 1969; 02 L3027 
SEQU Mineral King 6-1-69 to Jul 8 1969 Pt. 5; RG 79. The permit specified the roadway as having 
a 24-foot driving surface, 6-foot paved shoulders, and 6-foot paved ditches in cut sections.
91
the other phases before, negotiations over the permits dragged on—in this case, 
over six months. Until issuance of permits, the Mineral King valley would remain 
quiescent. The Park Service's long dalliance, reviews, and negotiations stalled 
actual work on the road for many years. When the permits seemed imminent in 
June 1969, and the Sierra Club knew the futility of further administrative 
lobbying, the Club embarked on a new strategy of litigation to halt development 
activities.
The Mineral King development has received significant attention for its 
resulting litigation history.204 The Mineral King case emerged as the second 
biggest environmental litigation in U.S. history after the Storm King case of 1965, 
in which a federal court ruled that the Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference 
had standing to sue over a proposed power plant. Samuel Hays suggests that the 
media magnified the effect of the relatively few environmental suits filed.205 In 
this matter, however, the lawsuit's importance cannot be overstated. Its 
importance lies in how it bought time for the Sierra Club (on top of the delays 
caused by the Park Service) to pursue other resolutions to the development 
problem; the lawsuit's value to the Club was not in its final adjudication. The 
204 cf. “Note, Mineral King Valley: Who Shall Watch the Watchmen?” Rutgers Law Review 25 
(1970-1971): 121-122; Ferguson and Bryson; Thomas Lundmark, Anne Mester, R. A. Cordes, and 
Barry S. Sandals, “Commentary, Mineral King Goes Downhill,” Ecology Law Quarterly 5 (1975-
1976): 555-574; and Joseph L. Sax, “Standing to Sue: A Critical Review of the Mineral King 
Decision,” Natural Resources Journal 13 (1973): 76-88. The article on which Supreme Court 
Justice William O. Douglas based a famous dissenting opinion can be found reprinted in 
Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?: And Other Essays on Law, Morals and the 
Environment (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oxford University Press, 1996). For context, see Roderick Nash, 




Club filed suit in federal district court on June 5, 1969, after the Forest Service 
approved the Disney master plan and permits were about to be issued. The Sierra 
Club asked for an injunction against development in the Mineral King Valley 
itself and an injunction against any actions toward improving the Mineral King 
Road because such work violated the Park Service's authority to construct roads 
across national park lands.206 Several of the Sierra Club's complaints related 
directly to an improved road: that it threatened giant sequoias; that the Park 
Service should not have authorized a road because it did not serve fundamental 
park purposes; that the Forest Service and Park Service accord did not make clear 
that no further enlargements would be necessary; and that by permitting the 
road, the Park Service would harm Sequoia National Park's natural state. On July 
23, 1969, the court granted the injunction.207
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, on appeal by federal attorneys, 
overturned the injunction, dismissed the Club's petitions as insubstantial, and 
ruled that the Club did not enjoy legal standing. After the Club appealed to the 
U.S. Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit agreed that the injunction would remain in 
effect until the Supreme Court decided on whether to hear the case.208 The 
Supreme Court accepted the case, and the subsequent legal proceedings revolved 
around the question of standing and whether the Sierra Club could bring suit 





margin, that the Club lacked standing to sue, but left the door open for it to file an 
amended lawsuit, which the Club soon did. In the revised complaint, the Sierra 
Club also alleged that the agencies failed to comply with the 1969 National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)—a piece of environmental legislation that did 
not exist when the lawsuit was first filed. The court set no date for trial, and the 
courts never offered a final resolution on the merits of the case.209 Rather, the 
legal proceedings “had stalled development efforts and caused a sizable deflation 
in development interest,” in the words of Harper.210 The Supreme Court decision, 
however, soon led to a key action by the California Legislature.
The Road to Sequoia National Park
Immediately following the Supreme Court's decision, Walt Disney 
Productions issued a press release in an attempt to meet objections of the 
development's opponents. Disney included a cog-railroad in these plans as a 
possible means of transporting visitors into the valley. John Harper thought the 
reappearance of the railroad suspicious, given that three years earlier Disney 
deemed the idea unacceptable and unprofitable. He surmised that Disney 
expected “a great upwelling of public empathy for the project, a mandate to go 




become the asset that Walt Disney had intended.”211 However, following these 
actions, the California Legislature in the summer of 1972 reassessed the road's 
inclusion in the state highway system.
Ike Livermore, California's secretary of resources under Governor Reagan, 
opposed the large Disney plan and especially resented Walt Disney Productions' 
insistence not to contribute to the road for its ski resort.212 The Republican 
Reagan administration inherited State approval of the project from the 
Democratic Edmund G. Brown. While Reagan approved of the development in 
principle, his fiscal conservatism argued against financing the road with taxpayer 
money. When Disney publicly discussed a cog railroad following the Supreme 
Court decision, Livermore seized his opportunity and with Assemblyman Edwin 
L. Z'berg succeeded in passing legislation to remove the road from state control. 
Reagan signed the legislation on August 18, 1972. Michael McCloskey, the Sierra 
Club's Executive Director during and after the litigation, recalls this move by the 
State Legislature and governor as crucial to turning the tide against Mineral King 
development. He additionally described the lawsuit as “absolutely critical” to 
gaining the Sierra Club time to build its case and secure this support, thereby 
underscoring the complicated political field in which the Club operated.213 The 
lawsuit was “absolutely critical,” but so were the delay resulting from the 
interagency conflict and the action of the California Legislature (whose action 
211 Ibid., 181.
212 Livermore, 78, 81.
213 McCloskey, 169.
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was pushed along by Livermore).
With the question of access as uncertain as ever, the Forest Service 
endeavored to complete an environmental impact statement, as required by 
NEPA. As Sequoia National Forest staff worked on draft and final versions of the 
EIS, incorporating public feedback, Walt Disney Productions began to look 
elsewhere for ski development. This survey included privately owned land around 
Independence Lake, north of Lake Tahoe, but land transfer problems soon 
snuffed out Disney's interest. The EIS examined a preferred transportation model 
of private automobiles on the lower portion of the road, diesel buses through 
Sequoia National Park on the existing road, and a cog railroad to cover the last 
several miles. The document additionally laid out a large number of alternatives, 
including no improvement to the road, construction of the State of California's 
original proposal, and monorail access.214 The Sierra Club found many of the 
same deficiencies with the report that had prompted the lawsuit, summed up by 
John Harper as “general environmental callousness”—a charge likely true, given 
the expansive development planned for the fragile alpine valley. The Forest 
Service considered another reduction in scale (which would be the fifth such 
reduction from Disney's 1965 plans) and again contemplated improving the 
access road as a way to keep costs down.215 As this seemingly endless process of 
revision, report and comment played out, efforts to incorporate the Mineral King 




California Congressmen John Krebs and Philip Burton and Senator Alan 
Cranston, Congress in 1978 passed an omnibus parks bill to transfer control of 
the valley to the National Park Service.216
The Mineral King struggle, from 1965 to 1978, fully demonstrates the 
aggressive nature of the modern environmental movement. After re-evaluating 
its initial support for the development in 1965, the Sierra Club used 
administrative and legislative lobbying in an attempt to stop a mammoth ski 
resort from coming to the valley. The Sierra Club, too, sought judicial resolution 
to the problem. And although the public discussion skirted the issue, the Mineral 
King story was every bit about wilderness as the Minaret Summit highway fight 
because increasing access meant decreasing wilderness. David Brower described 
Mineral King as “one of the really extraordinary thresholds to wilderness.” That 
is, even if you do not define Mineral King itself as wilderness (because of the 
cabins or mining remnants), Brower felt it warranted protection because of its 
surroundings.217 The struggle came down to access: automobiles had been able to 
travel up to Mineral King since the early twentieth century, but not in the 
numbers and conditions required by a large ski resort. Despite the outspokenness 
of the skiing advocates, the project failed to harmonize with the public mood 
regarding environmental protection. From the new government-funded road to 
the massive village in Mineral King, the Mineral King ski resort ran against the 
grain of the wilderness and environmental protections of the 1960s and 1970s.




Chapter 5: Conclusion: Irreconcilable Differences
In 1957, while the Tioga Road controversy was in full bore, Sierra Club 
President Harold Bradley wrote to National Park Service Director Conrad Wirth, 
in an attempt to ameliorate some of the tension between the organizations. 
Although in Wisconsin until after his retirement from professorship in 1948, 
Bradley was an old-guard Club member who had participated from afar in the 
Hetch Hetchy battle in the early twentieth century. Bradley's letter portrays the 
Sierra Club as a deferential organization and uses the metaphor of an “ideal 
married couple” to describe their relations: “Yours must always be the final 
decision. Ours–like the wife–may be that of suggestion, if we are playing the part 
well and acceptably to you. If we are not playing the role acceptably, we shall wish 
to be told where we fail, because our very dearest love is to see the Service 
succeed to the highest extent.”218 Bradley goes on to define the problems between 
the organizations as one of communication. Had the two organizations engaged 
in “better communications before decisions have been made,” such a “mistake” as 
the Tioga Road improvement could have been avoided.219 
While Bradley felt the Sierra Club and the Park Service could have come to 
agreement had they only worked harder, the two organizations had been growing 
further apart in their goals. They both may have claimed to be seeking to protect 
the Sierran landscape, but their definitions of that protection differed. The Park 




Service, as evidenced by the Mission 66 development program, felt a strong need 
to provide for use of the national parks, which included adequate roads and other 
visitor facilities. The Sierra Club grew increasingly wilderness-oriented following 
the war, as seen in its opposition to the Minaret Summit Road and a large ski 
resort at Mineral King. If the Club and the Service ever been an “ideal married 
couple,” by the 1950s they should have been contemplating divorce, and could 
have cited the issue of wilderness as an “irreconcilable difference.”
The Sierra Nevada has served as a crucible for forming environmental 
policy in the United States. Especially since the federal government established 
national parks and national forests in the mountain range, the Sierra has seen 
many environmental battles waged over its resources.220 The National Park 
Service and U.S. Forest Service have sought to balance use (or sometimes a 
specific subset of use, recreation) with the need to protect the natural resources. 
They have sometimes been aligned with the aims of the Sierra Club, but have at 
other times been at loggerheads with one another. From their inception, the Park 
Service and the Forest Service made provisions for access. The Sierra Club 
supported the ambitious roadbuilding plans of Stephen Mather, even introducing 
its own road ideas and contributing to purchase of the Tioga Road in Yosemite 
National Park. The Club advocated development in the Sierra Nevada, in keeping 
220 Before the federal government established parks and forests, Central Valley farmers and Sierra 
Nevada hydraulic miners (who used the force of water under pressure to wash away whole 
mountainsides in search of gold) clashed over Sierran mining. For an account of the court battle 
(decided in 1884) that ended hydraulic mining in California, see Robert L. Kelley, Gold vs. Grain: 
The Hydraulic Mining Controversy in California's Sacramento Valley (Glendale, Calif.: Arthur 
H. Clark, 1959). Although this struggle had great environmental consequences, those involved 
fought it on economic terms.
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with its bylaw of rendering the mountains accessible. At least to the end of 1945, 
the Sierra Club had endorsed reconstruction of the Tioga Road to higher 
standards, accepted a trans-Sierra crossing in the vicinity of Mammoth Pass, and 
supported a ski development at Mineral King.
Following the war, the Sierra Club suffered an identity crisis. Increasing 
numbers of Americans sought out nature recreation, threatening to love the parks 
and forests to death. The Forest Service and Park Service continued with the 
policies they had always had, making the natural resources available for use and 
recreation. But each in its way intensified its efforts in this regard. The Forest 
Service expanded logging operations on its lands, leading to the Deadman Creek 
controversy over the necessity of logging such a large area, more forest road 
construction to facilitate the logging, and more and larger recreational 
developments such as that proposed for Mineral King. The Park Service for many 
years during and after World War II lacked funds to do any development work, 
but in 1956 embarked on the Mission 66 program to upgrade and expand visitor 
facilities. These efforts, geared to make the parks and forests more accessible, 
stood at odds with the Sierra Club's growing feeling that the Sierra had become 
accessible enough in the years since the Club's founding. As the Club—and here I 
speak of it as if it were of a single mind, but various personalities within it have 
affected its course as leaders and directors—evaluated these new outlooks of the 
Park Service and Forest Service, it rejected some of its earlier positions and came 
down on the side of automobile-free wilderness.
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The wilderness idea embraced by the Sierra Club following the war had its 
origins in the interwar years. The Club's growing concern over recreation on 
these federal lands mirrored the philosophy espoused by The Wilderness Society, 
whose rise against automobile-oriented recreation on natural lands is well-
described by Paul Sutter. That definition of wilderness has at its heart that 
wilderness is roadless, and the definitions is so important because it gained the 
force of law with passage of the Wilderness Act. But the Sierra Club's 
comparatively tardy acceptance of this wilderness definition challenges the 
historiography of the postwar debate. Sutter demonstrated that the interwar 
years, at least, broke from the traditional preservation/natural resource use 
rubric, but accepts its resurgence following World War II. Roderick Frazier Nash 
and Mark Harvey also believe that the postwar movement for wilderness 
protection had at its heart concern with water development.
The Sierra Club opposed dams elsewhere in the arid West, but at “home” 
in the Sierra Nevada it fought against itself as it challenged the improved Tioga 
Road and the Minaret Summit highway. These battles occurred as the Sierra Club 
gained an increasingly influential national role in the environmental movement, 
and in part helped the Club (along with The Wilderness Society) win approval for 
the Wilderness Act. The fight to block development of Mineral King as a ski resort 
cemented the power of the Sierra Club, just as the large public support for the 
Sierra Club's position demonstrated both acceptance of the tenets of the 
Wilderness Act and the uneasiness with large recreational developments on 
natural lands.
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The combination of these Sierran struggles demonstrates that in these 
mountains, at least, the Sierra Club's major wilderness concern was over 
recreation. If we accept the argument of Nash, Sutter, and Harvey that water use 
dominated the wilderness discussion, we overlook a major part of the Sierra 
Club's experience that pushed it so strongly toward wilderness. Recognition of 
how these battles turned on the question of roads and recreation increases the 
importance of Sutter's work. While the founders of The Wilderness Society had 
ties around the country, the Society itself had a distinctly eastern orientation, as 
evidenced by its early opposition to the Blue Ridge Parkway. The Sierra Club's 
later grappling with issues caused by recreation in California, and specifically the 
Sierra Nevada, builds the case that recreation problems extended beyond the 
interwar years as a central, rather than peripheral, concern of the environmental 
movement.
The traditional twentieth century wilderness narrative begins with the 
dichotomy of preservation (an umbrella term that included development for 
recreation and tourism) versus natural resource use. Sutter drew out the 
increased interwar concern with recreation itself—the fight was within the 
formerly coherent “preservation” category. I argue that the problems of 
recreation remained a dominant concern following World War II, even as new 
threats from dams did develop. As Cronon states, wilderness areas are not 
divorced from history, but are very direct manifestations of the cultures in which 
they are produced. We cannot know what we hope to gain by protecting 
wilderness unless we understand why we protect it in the first place. Because 
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there is no singular wilderness definition, we must look to context to explain why 
the wilderness and national park landscape exists as it does. By examining these 
Sierran examples, we see that the Sierra Club reacted to the growing involvement 
of the automobile in outdoor recreation just as clearly as had the Society. The 
Sierra Club's reaction is significant, because it has shaped the managed landscape 
of the southern Sierra Nevada differently than would have other concerns over 
natural resource use. Because there are many interests in any wilderness 
designation, there is room for multiple explanations; the Sierra Club's acceptance 
of roadless wilderness deserves recognition as a crucial part of forming the 
modern idea of wilderness.
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Appendix
List of Present-Day Sierra Nevada Automobile Crossings
from North to South
Pass Name Route Number Elevation (ft.)
Beckwourth Pass CA 70 5,203
Yuba Pass CA 49 6,709
Donner Summit I 80 7,239
Echo Summit U.S. 50 7,382
Carson Pass CA 88 8,592
Ebbetts Pass CA 4 8,756
Sonora Pass CA 108 9,609
Tioga Pass CA 120 9,944
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